A STUDY ON THE RECORD OF MEDITATION ON THE MIND AND AWAKENING FROM DREAM[1]觀心覺夢鈔之研究

(1) Problem of the real author

As in the introduction to the engraving of the ‘Record of Meditation on the Mind and Awakening from Dream’[2] Tien-shou, the Sramana of Chiang-hu said: “In this book the name of the author was not given, but some people said that it was written by Liang-pien, others said that it was written by Chung-kuang; in brief, it can never be a work of an unlearned man.” From these few words though we cannot decide whether Liang-pien or Chung-kuang was the real author, yet, it indicates that this work cannot be accredited to somebody else than Liang-pien and Chung-kuang. While if we fefer to Liang-pie’s another work ‘The Important Secrets of the True-Heart’[3] in which we can find the same strange term ‘空為門’ AS WE HAVE FOUND IN THE ‘Record of Meditation on the Mind and Awak ening from Dream’.[4] As in the former work Liang-pien wrote:「故廣百論云：『然其門義順在於空，有有有等皆順執心，空空空等皆違妄執。故有智者聞說空言，應離一切有無等執，悟法真理非有非空。』加之大師判空為門故，入於真性。樸陽述：『若論顯理，要資空觀，凡此門意，一切諸法皆無自性，無生無滅，本來寂靜，自性涅槃。』其無生滅之一法者即是一心。In this paragraph he mentioned the great master (P’u-yang?) who distinguished the real nature as the sphere of inaction（空為門）. And it indicates that this term might have been used by P’u-yang. But, in spite of whether P’u-yang used it or not we are, however, inclined to agree with those people who claimed that the ‘Record of Meditation on the Mind and Awakening from Dream’ was written by Liang-pien, if this single term is not too weak to stand for our evidence.

(2) Personal history of Liang-pien (1193-1252)[5]

Linag-pien was born in Kyoto, his family name was Fujiwara, his given name was Hsin-yuan（信願）, and his appellation was Lien-a. From early youth he was shaved and became a monk at 勝願院of 興福寺. Then he studied the doctrine of Dharmalaksana from 覺遍of 光明院. Afterwards, he visited many temples for study of some profound principles. He was versed in the Buddhist Logic and his good reputation was known both in Nara and Kyoto. In the year of 1221 he was appointed as a questioner at the Vimalakirtti association. In 1230 he became a lecturer in Buddhist studies, then he was appointed as a great superintendent of Sangha or the authority of the Dharma-seal. But he was rather disgusted by the worldly glory, so he built a small cottage by the side of the 春日神社, and named it as the ‘Cottage of Lecture and Discussion’. In 1232 as 覺盛hoisted the pennant of vinaya at the ‘Pineyard（松院）

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of興福寺，so he recived the discipline of emptiness of wishes. Then as he found that the text of Vinaya was not quite clear, and he had an idea to revive the vinaya. Meanwhile, inasmuch as 覺盛had already established a rule on the natural moral law of Bhiksus, but some students were still doubtful about it and arguments were arising among them; in order to instruct those students who were in doubt he wrote the ‘Record of Literal Reasoning of Bhiksus’ to identify the modern Bhiksu’s law with that of the age of the Buddha. Later on, he lived in 白毫寺where he widely expounded sila, in the meantime, there was a monk called 圓照who came from 戒壇院, enquired about the doctrine of Dharmalaksana. In the year of 1241 (or 1232) he retired to the great holy 竹林寺at Mt. Shen-ma, where he established a Pure-Land Association and inclined to the practice of pure deeds. In 1246 圓爾辨圜gave lectures on the ‘Record as the Mirror of the Dhyana School’ at 普門寺in Kyoto, he attended to the lecture with 真空, in the same year he wrote ‘The Important Secrets of True Heart’ in three volumes, which dealt with the summits of dharmalaksana doctrine; and 辨圜wrote a colophon for him. Then he also lived at 知足院of the Eastern Great Temple and revived its ruins, he named it as the New Villa（新別所）, which was used as a place of expounding sila. He was well versed in dharmalaksana and vinaya pitaka, and also studied pureland school; he advocated that all deeds are dependent on the original vows. Then in 1251 he suffered from illness, so he entrused 覺澄with the charge of 知足院and retired to竹林寺. And on the 28th day of eighth month in 1252 he entered the ever tranquility. His relic was enshrined at the Stupa-yard behind竹林寺. People called him as the great superintendent of sangha, and also honoured him as bodhisattva Lien-a（蓮阿菩薩）. He wrote a great number of books, as望月enumerated 30 works in the Great Dictionary of Buddhist Terms; but we can find only three books in the Ta-chen Great Tripitaka:

(1) No. 2312, ‘Record of Meditation on the Mind and Awakening from Dream’, written in classical Chinese.

(2) No. 2313, ‘The Improtant Secrets of the True Heart’, written in casssical Chinese.

(3) No. 2314, ‘An Outline of Dharmalaksana Doctrine’

I　PREFACE

Before study on the doctrines of ‘Consciousness Only’ which conveyed in this text book, the historical development of the thought of Buddhist philosophy must be clarified; then, if we meet any problems in the systematic theory of ‘Consciousness Only’ we may easily find a clew for the solution of them.

The original teaching of Gautama, the Buddha, was merely a kind of religious and moral discipline, which was rather simple and humane. In the religious part, his special discovery was that the human personality consists of five skandhas; and based on this idea he proclaimed the three characteristics;

(1) All the constituents of being are transitory,

(2) All the constituents of being are misery, and

(3) All the elements of being are lacking in an Ego.

As for the metaphysical part in Sutras and the explanations of which in Abhidharmas are obviously the productions of later centuries, and thos commentators not only classified the old doctrine into what they deemed the systematic orders, but they also gradually added some new theories of their own ages to the old doctrine. Such works are, however, mostly subjective and dogmatical metaphysics.[6] Then, came down to the sectarian age, the old doctrine had already been analysed into a complicated list of all things, such as the one hundred seventy elements of the school of presiding elders and the seventyfive elements of the realistic school. And the thought of the realistic school was quite close to that of Yogācāra school, but, during that age a positive idea of consciousness only was not yet formed; it was until Asanga founded the Yogācāra school the theory of consciousness only was strongly established on the systematic and logical basis. Then, to the age of his followers the Yogācāra school was prevailing in whole India, and its teaching cut a brilliant figure in the philosophical field.

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During the golden age of Yogācāra school there was a noted monk known as Hsuan-Chuang, who came from China and stayed at Nalanda, the famous monastery, where he studied many important text books of Yogācāra school for five years, and also visited many other famous places; after seventeen long years of visiting study he returned back to China and founded the Vidyamatrasiddhi-Dharmalaksana school, He had translated many important Sutras and Sastras, and also preached the doctrine of consciousness only. During preaching he gathered several different commentaries on th ‘Vidyāmātrasiddhi-tridasa-‘sāstra’ and wove them together into one synthetic and complete work, which was entitled ‘The Complete Vidyāmātrasiddhi-‘sāstra’.

In point of the ‘Record of Meditation on the Mind and Awakening from Dream’, it is known as a very important work on the philosophy of Consciousness Only, just as in the beginning of this book the author related: “The text books of Consciousness Only are vast and their significances are deep, one cannot grasp them directly; therefore, I only gathered some extracts into this concise book and do hope that it can show a way which leads to the true significance of the Consciousness Only.” According to these few words and the whole contents of this book we can judge that a great part of materials of the text were copied out from Chinese original texts, but, it is undoubtedly that the author had really contributed much time in arranging, organizing and compiling; and he patched them so well that one can hardly see that it is a patched-up work. There are, however, some parts which are evidently the author’s statements, which are distinguishable only by the pattern of syntax and the usage of words. Based on these reasons we are convinced that this book cannot be counted as purely of Liang-Pien’s work, and perhaps we should, if we may, call him the compiler or the narrator rather than the author.

II　ON THE TEXTUAL CONSTRUCTION

Generally speaking, the textual construction of this book is clear and refind. But, owing to the Chinese language is foreign language to the author, therefore, no matter how many years he had devoted to the study of Chinese, he canot avoid making slight errors such as the usage of some inappropriate words and some wordy clauses. Examples in detail will be given as follows:

(1) Ambiguity of sentences: e. g. “遂謁戒賢論師廣傳此宗，戒賢論師待三藏良久”。即五部大論十支諭等凡法相法門無遺皆傳。遂還震旦盛弘此宗。P.2-3, “三國傳來”〔八宗鋼要抄出〕

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凝然述）, There are four separate sentences in the above passage, and it seems that they are quite independent and without any conjunctions between them; moreover, if we examine the first sentence, it might be rendered as such meaning: “Then he visited Silabhadra, the Yoga master, and was widely expounding the doctrine of Yogācāra sect.” But, the real meaning is: “Then he visited Silabhadra, the Yoga master, who was widely expounding the doctrine of Yogācāra sect.” If this sentence be: corrected we may write as: “遂謁戒賢論師，爾時彼適廣傳此宗”。Added four words to the original sentence. In another way, we may only change the first two words into and insert a conjunction between the first and second sentend sentences, and unite them into one sentence; while the repetition of the name of Silabhadra must be avoided. Then this complex sentence will be as this: “爾時戒賢論師廣傳此宗，且待三藏良久。” in English as: “In the Meantime, Silabhadra, the Yoga master, was widely expounding the doctrine of Yogācāra sect, and a watiing Hsuan-Chuang’s coming for a long time.” And between the second and third sentences there also must be a conjunctive medium to join them together, and it must be two words: “既至”, this means “when he arrived.” Then the whole sentence should be like this: “既至，即將五部大論十支論等凡法相法門皆傳無遺。” in this sentence the word “將” is to insert, and “皆傳” are to place before “無遺”, so as to make this sentence in Chinese pattern. The whole meaning is “When he arrived, then the master gave him lectures on the five main sastras and the other ten minor sastras of Dharmalaksana school, and nothing was conserved.” The fourth sentence is all right, but as we are always trying to avoid from repetition as two same words appear in one short passage, so we must change “遂” into “後”. The word “遂” means “then” and the word “後” has the same meaning also bears the meaning of “after wards” so the whole meaning of this sentence is “Afterwards, he went back to China and prospered with this school.” The correction of this whole passage is as ollows:

“爾時戒賢論師廣傳此宗，且待三藏良久。既至，即將五部大論，十支論等，凡法相法門皆傳無遺。後還震旦，盛弘此宗。”

(2) Obsolete word: e. g. “至於流傳日本者惣有三傳。” (P. 3, ninth line) in this sentence the word “ ” is identified with “總”, but in this case the word “凡” will be more fitting.

(3) Word bears both obsolete and current meanings: e. g. “清淨一味同正法昔矣.” (P.92, first line). in this sentence the word “昔” currently bears the meaning of “the past”, but here it is used as “lasting” or “long.” Such usage we can find only in the ‘Book of Odes’.[7] To read such a sentence one may feel quite unharmonious, like a boat sails smoothly across the river, but, nearly to the shore it runs on a reef. So, in order to keep textual harmony, the word “昔” should be replaced by the word “久”.

(4) Imperfect clause: e. g. “此約菩薩而所論也” (P.33, last line), according to the context this clause should be like this: “此約菩薩所斷而論也”, and if we like to make it short, then we may write: “此約菩薩而論也”; if we use the word “所”, we must also use the word “斷” to fill the imperfect meaning.

(5) The appearance of a strange term: e.g. “此空為門所顯真理其體非空。

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” (P.42, 8th line) in this sentence the term “空為門” is really very strange in Buddhism. According to the context we can find that it should be “法空門”, but we do not know whether this “空為門” is a mistake or a new term which was created by master Liang-Pien?

(6) Unskilful usage of word: e. g. “其真如者，即此真如一分義邊。” (P.42, last line), and “二邊功能不可混濫”, (P.68, 7th line), in these two sentences the word “邊” is liable to be misunderstook, we had better use the word “者” to replace it.

(7) Unnecessary words padded in a sentence: e. g. “是故名之親辨自果，自體辨生，親因緣也。” (P.65, 7th line). In this sentence “是故名之” seems only padded up for the balance of four-word-verses, but, in fact, this text is by no means written in verses; therefore, it is reasonable to lop off those unnecessary words in sentences. And “是故名之” will be lopped off its both ends and only keep “故名”.

(8) Unnecessary abbreviation of a complete term: e. g. “今此思種亦能生自思數現所.” (P.68, 6th line) in this sentence “現所” should be the term “現行心所”, and we should write it in complete form, otherwise it is unreadable.

(9) Ambiguity of preposition: e. g. “然者，所執一性之中情有理無，故總名為中道。” (P.99, last line) In this sentence the first two words are quite ambiguous that can hardly make sense, if we change the second word into the word “此”, it will be quite clear. And the whole sentence is like this: “然此所執一性之中，情有理無，故總名為中道。” The same error we can find on page 123, ninth line: “然者三性即一性。” and its correction as: “然此三性即一性。” and on page 135, last line, there is the same error, it should be “然此唯止無用疑網。”

(10) Term of Japanese pattern: e. g. “最初始行，當分法要，願示肝心。” (P.141, 8th line) In this sentence the term “肝心” is not familiar to Chinese scholars, but, if we write into better Chinese it should be like this: “最初行持，

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當分法要，願示綱領。”

(11) An extra word in a sentence: e. g. “以無限善根，方所感得故。” (P.146, 7th line). In this sentence the word “方” is not necessarily to place here, without it the sentence is quite clear, to have it, will make this sentence bulgar.

(12) Misprinted words: e. g. “但其尋伺定應不俱.” (P.70, 3rd line) and “正根及種子，但親所緣緣，無疎所緣緣。” (P.56, 4th line), in these two sentences the word “但” must be a misprinted word, because there is not such a word in Chinese dictionaries; and yet, according to the context the meaning of this word shoul be the word “但”. Again, another example: “所謂虎狼野于獼猴等。” (P.147, first line). In this sentence the name of a kind of wild animal “野干” is taken the sound of a Sanskrit word “Srgala”,[8] and in Chinese we pronounce as “Yeh-kan”, if write the second word as “于”, it will be pronounced as “Yu”; so, this error should be accredited to the publisher.

(13) The absence of one word in a sentence: e. g. “若云非妄語亦非口相，但是鹿淺門，而非實義者” The blank in this sentence we may refer to the same text book in sastra pitaka, in which we can find that the absented word in this sentence is the word “事”. This error must be also accredited to the publisher.

(14) Tedious repetitions in sentences: e. g.

“各各一一，皆應分緣具足之時。” (P.40, 3rd line)

“是故一切法：一切皆無我。” (P.41, 2nd line)

“五根五塵，心心所等，各各別別，虛假相似.” (P.44, 9th line)

“於恆恆時，於常常時，一切遠離凝然常住.” (95, 8th line)

“皆有八識，有諸心所,” (P.147, 3rd line) In this clause the fifth word “有” had better replaced by the word “及”.

III　ON THE “SIX KINDS OF ASAMSKRTA DHARMA” Extracts from “HUNDRED DIVISIONS OF ALL MENTAL QUALITIES AND THEIR AGENTS”[9]

Before discussing the question of Asamskrta dharmas we must firstly have a clear about the definition of the word ‘Asamskrta’. According to the ‘Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms’ this word has various meanings, such as: “non-active passive; laisser-faire; spontaneous, natural; uncaused, not subject to cause, condition, or dependence; transcendental, not in time, unchanging, eternal, inactive, and free from the passions or senses; nonphenomenal, noumenal; nirvāna, dharma-nature, reality.” And secondly, we must also have a Thorough knowledge of different ideas of Sthaviravadin, Sarvāstivādins and Vidyāmātrin on the same ‘Asamskrta dharmas’:

(1) In the Sthaviravādin school there is only one Asamskrta dharma, that is nirvāna[10], which is the extinction of all roots which give rise to the future life, and it is also called the cessation of the phenomenal life; and it is also called the cessation of the phenomenal life; but, those who have attained to nirvāna their bodies can remain until their death, and after death those constituents of body will naturally dissolve, and no more karma remains. For this reason they established two kinds of nirvāna: a) Sopādhiśesa-nirvāna, this is the nirvāna that one can attain during his life-time; b) Nirupa-dhisesa-nirvāna, this is the state after the dissolution of the constituents of body. Such kind of idea is purely due to the overvaluing of tranquility of the mind and the negation of the active life, and, at last it brings the destruction of life.

(2) In the list of Sarvāstivadins school there are three kinds of asamskrta dharmas: a) The ākāsa, it means passive void or space. According to the Abhidarma-kosa-śāstra “Among the three asamskrta dharmas only the ākāśa has the unhindered nature, and as it is so, all things are moving in it.”[11] Concerningā kāša MeGovern said: “There is an important point we must now take notice: that is the Sthaviravadin school listed the ‘akaśa’ in those material things which are completed by the four elements. But, the Sarvastivadin schoool to have it promoted as one of the Asamskrta dharmas. In point of fact, however, the Sarvāstivādin school seemed to have been distinguishing two kinds of ākāśa, the first kind is permanent and in every where like ether; and the other kind is the empty space which is like people often related it with the visible vault of space.”[12]

After reading both Abhidharma-kosa and MeG overn’s explanations, we can still hardly form a clear idea of the definition of ‘ākāśa’, but, we candecide, at least, that it is by no means of something profound, nor does it show any tendency to the ‘suchness’ of the Yogācāra school; because it was only arranged on the first step of the three-stepladder. According to this rule we can easily understand that the so called ‘akaśa’ is nothing more than a state of mental tranquility which is formed by the meditation on the space, in which all passions are temporarily ceased and only an empaty space is present. Such a state is by no means permanent, nevertheless, it had really been a great suggestion to the early thought of consciousness only; because it was purely established on the basis of mental transformations. And as for the reason why the Saryāstivādin school would not use the term ‘nirvāna’ as their asamskrta-dharma? There are at least two reasons: (i) They seemed to begin to doubt about the possibslity of attainment of nirvāna, so they would not sacrifice their lives for the only cause of the unattainable vainglory of the old noble nirvana; (ii) perhaps they should have referred their questions to the unchangeable-change-law of the three characteristics and found that there cannot be a state of eternal tranquility of the mind; but only the essence of changeable things is unchangeable, yet, it is not the kind of nirvāna. b) The asamskrta which is attained by the power of wisdom, which discriminates body, sensation, mind and all things are as impermanent, painful and egoless; thus gradually quenched the passions and attained to a state fo mental tranquility. Me Govern said that this asamskrta is equal to the unique asamskrta (the nirvāna) of Sthaviravādin school.[13] c) The asamskrta which is attained not by the power of wisdom but by the absence of tempting objects, as the life of a hermit completely keeps from human world.

(3) The six kinds of asamskrta dharma of Yogācāra school: The first three are adopted from the Sarvāstivādins school, and their meanings are as those explanations in above items; so they are needless to be repeated.

The fourth one is called Acalā, which means inaction, a mental state of being unmoved by pleasure or pain.

The fifth one is called’ ‘Samjna-vedana-nirodha, it means the extinction of sensation and thought; and is a mental state which is attained by concentration of the mind.

The last one is called ‘Tathatā’ it means suchness, it is the eternal; impersonal, unchangeable reality behind all phenomena.

In each of the former five asamskrta-dharmas is distinguished into the state which is changed by the mind, and the state of the dharma-nature; the former is only the resemblance of asamskrta, while the latter is the real asamskrta. In other words, the former five kinds of asamskrta-dharmas are all accredited to the ordinary or relative statements, but, only the last one is the absolute reality. Nevertheless, the Yogācāra masters will still distinguish this absolute reality into the state wnich is changed by the mind, and the state of the dharma-nature. Inasmuch as it is the eternal, impersonal, unchangeable reality behind all phenomena, and is the ‘suchness’, it can never be touched nor imitated by the mind; otherwise, if it can be touched and imitated it can never be the unchangeable reality!! Therrefore, this mental state of immut able relity is quite false and cannot be established as and attribution of the ‘suchness’.

Concerning the ‘suchness’ MeGovern said: “The addition of this dharma, was a great revolution in Buddhism, it oberturned the ontology of the Stha-biravāstivadins schools. As these two schools had always deemed that all dharmas are always in separate divisions; but, since the Yogācāra school established the ‘suchness’ they explained all dharmas as the ejects of this fundamental reality.”*[14] But, as a matter of fact, this great revolution did not rise by the Yogacara school, as regards the initiation, it must be traced back to the Sarvastivadin school; as they had already laid a good foundation, on which the Yogācāra school established their new theory. According to this order of development of Buddhist thought, we can make a clear list about their different view points on truth and their different attitudes toward humanlife:

(i) The Sthaviravadin’s view point on truth is the inconceivable state of the extinction of body and mind, and their attitude towards humanlife is absolutely desperate and negative.

(ii) The Sarvāstivādins’ view point on truth is the absolute and eternal tranquility of the mind, and their attitude towards human-life is negligent and Indifferent.

(iii) The Yogacārā’s view point on truth is the absolute essence of all things which is the ‘suchness’, and their attitude towards human-life is neither negligent nor positive; therefore, sometimes is irresponsible.

IV ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOUR MENTAL FUNCTIONS[15]

In order to vindicate the ‘suchness’ as the absolute essence of all things, the establishment of a complete logical theory is indispensable; so the Yogācāra adduced six different sutras and eleven sastras to support their theory of consciousness only. The focus of this theory is Ālayavijñāna, and if the Yogācārs masters failed to prove the existence of ālayavijñāna, then their ‘suchness’ would also be unable to stand; and if they could not prove the four mental unctions, they would also be unable to establish their thsory of ‘consciousness only’.

On the functions of the mind the early Yogācāra masters had different ideas: such as Sthitamati who advocated only one, that is the power of discrimination; Bandhuprabha who advocated two, they are the power of discrimination and the mental phenomena; Gina, who advocated three, they are the power of discrimination, the mental phenomena and the function of discrimination; and Dharmapāla, who advocated four, three are as above, he added another one that is the proof or assurance of the power of discrimination.[16]

To discuss the four mental functions, the author held out eight problems and also answered them one by one. The eight problems and their answers are as follows:

(1) Is that because the mind is the power that discriminates, so, it transforms into objects? or because the objects are discriminated by the mind so they can transform into mind?

Ans.: The mind and mental conditions are the substance, and its functions can naturally discriminate, if the mind has no objects that can be discriminated, then it cannot be the power of discrimination. Therefore, the objects must be the transformations of the mind. This is because the power of discrimination is superior, and has the sovereign power that can creat all things; while material things are not the power of discrimination, yet, their body and nature are dull and infersor, so they can neither transform nor give rise to the function of discrimination.

(2) Suppose objects are though outside the mind, yet, when the mind gives rese to discrimination, it could complete its function; why should the mind transform into objects?

Ans.; On denying real objects outside the mind there are many reasons that are used for destroying the real ego and real things of heretics and hinayana Buddhists, such as those various descriptions in the Vidyāmātrasiddhi śsatra,[17] as we cannot produce everything here but, only present the four kinds of wisdom from Abhidharma-Sutra[18] which can accomplish bodhisattvas’ correct views for brief examples:

a) The wisdom of contradiction: As on one object, owing to the different causation of karmas of ghosts, animals, human-beings and devas, they have different views respectively: a ghost sees it as fire; a man sees it as water; a deva sees it as vaidurya; and fishes see it as dwellings. If the object is real, how can it follow different karmas of different beings and transform itself into diffdrent things?

b) The wisdom of objectless cognition: This means the mind during functioning on the unreal objects of past, futute or the objects in a dream, those objects are though unreal yet, they appear in the mind as real. If the mind should be dependent on the outside objects, then, how can we explain the above problems? Therefore, all objects must be created by the mind.

c) The wisdom of untopsyturviness: This means that if all objects should be real, then, all wordings should besages; because they originally realize the outside objects as real, and if it is real all right, then, they can get emancipation naturally and not depend upon any practice, what a false idea:*!

d) The wisdom of transformations that depend on three wisdoms: The three wisdoms are: (i) Transformations depend on those who have got emancipation, such beings can transform water, fire, wind etc. according to their wishes. If objects are real, how can they transform things according to their wishes? (ii) Transformations depend on the wisdom of meditators. This means those who have attained the superior samadhi when they meditate on the nine stages of disintegration of the dead body: blue, swelling and other ojects will appear; if objects are real, how can they appear according to one’s thinking? (iii) Transformation depend on the wisdom of undiscrimination. This means those who have realized the wisdom of undiscrimination, that all objects will not appear; if objects are real, how could such things happen? Therefore, when a bodhisattva accomplished in these four wisdoms, then he can decisively realize the theory of consciousness only. And thus the objects outside the mind are not recognized.

Concerning to the former four kinds of wisdom and the latter three wisdoms, if they are used as methods of contemplation they will be unquestionable, but, the Yogācāra masters used them as data of their theory of ‘consciousness only’ seemed rather too weak; because those so called wisdoms in term of knowledge yet are incorrect, not speak of wisdom.

(3) When mental phenomena appear, the power of discrimination can directly know them, for what profound reason should it have another function of discrimination?

Ans.: The mind can only know its own function, it cannot directly know the mental phenomena; therefore, when the mind gives rives rise to the function of discriminating phemomena, which is the function of discrimination, so the power of discriminatson cannot directly know the mental phenomena.

(4) When the function of discrimination arises, there must have mind and mental phenomena, why should establish the power of discrimination?

Ans.: Like a man measures a piece of silk with the rule: the silk is the material that will be measured, the rule is the mean that can measure; and the man is the knower of the result of measurement. Therefore, if there is not the function of discrimination, the mind cannot know the objects; if there is not the mental phenomena, what is the use of the function of discrimination? And if there is not the power of discrimination, who knows that the function of discrimination can discriminate the mental phenomena? For this reason there must be the third one.

(5) When the power of discrimination is established, the function of discrimination can also discriminate inside, then the three functions are quite enough, why should there be the fourth function?

Ans.: The function of inward proof must be deep and refined, therefore, it must be the direct inference; but, as the function of discrimination is used as the outward discrimination, yet, it has not only direct inference but has also indirect and wrong idferences; therefore, it cannot know its own inwardness. And if there is not the foueth function, then, the power of discrimination should have no result of its discrimination, therefore, the proof of the power of discrimination must be established.

(6) The mental phenomena are objects of the mind, so it is reasonable that the mind know them, but the other three functions are only different discriminations, why should one know there is the proof of the power of discrimination?

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Ans.: The four functions are all accredited to the mind, and should be proved by the mind, if there is any one cannot be proved, it will be unreasonable. Therefore, the latter three functions are though the power that can discriminate, yet, because there are minute significance of mutual discrimination which will also become the objects of the mind; is this not profound?

(7) If the power of discrimination is also a function of the mind, then among the four functions which is the substance of the mind?

Ans.: The mind is so minute and subtle that we can haadly know its substance and phenomena, but only manifests its substance by all its functions; therefore, there are only gour functions of the mind, however, if we are obliged to judge which is the substance and which are functions, then, we must say that only the power of discrimination is the substance, because it is the medium that can prove both its inwardness and its function of discrimination.

(8) Does it mean that the consciousness only will deny the existence of things outside the mind? If the proposition of mind only is established, yet, will not deny the existence of non-mental things, how can it be tne teaching of mind only?

Ans.: The theory of consciousness only does not mean that it deals only with the mintal qualities, but it also traces the source of all things and deals with the rise of all phenomena; therefore, it though recognizes many differences, yet, not a single dharma is independent from the mind. And though all things are inside the mind, yet, the colours, sounds, water, fire, eyes, ears etc. yet, are all rising up from the mind, just like the objects that one sees in a dream, therefore, it is called ‘consciousness only’.

V THREE KINDS OF MENTAL PHENOMENA*

Inasmuch as the Yogācāra masters advocated that all things are rising up from the mind, so, their next task is according to transformations of causes, of discrimination and of a mixture of causes and discrimination, to classify all phenomena into three kinds:

(1) The natural or unchangeable phenomena. This kind of phenomena are produced by some real seeds of the five senses and ālayavijñāna, and are in real substance and have real function; and the discisminating function of the mind can discriminate their individualities. Furthermore, as such kind of phenomena are always keeping their own nature and do not follow the changeable function of discrimination of the mind, so they are called the natural phenomena. Such kind of phenomena are just like the blue sky, the white snow, the green colour of foliage and the soft and loud sound of the evening bell from an old monastery; when we hear or see them, no matter whether we are in a joyful or melancholy mood, we can see the true colour and hear the correct cound which are always unchangeable by our mind. These are the so called natural phenomena.

(2) Phenomena of indepent shadows. This kind of phenomena are produced by the sixth bijñāna, in which some seeds are always in accordance with the function of discrimination of the mind, and without real substance nor have real functiyn; and the discriminating function of the mind cannot discriminate iheir individualities. As they have no substance but only rise up like shadows, so they are called the phenomena of shadows only. Such kind of phenomena are just like those attractive characters in a fiction, after read the fiction some people feel sad, some people feel joyous and some people even fall in love with them; or like precious things one sees in a dream; or like some objects one sees in his meditation. These are the so called phenomena of shadows only.

(3) Phenomena that accompany with objective substance. This kind of phenomena are produced by the seventh vijñāna when it discriminates the mental phenomena whidh are transformed by the discriminating function of ālayavijñāna, and though the function of discrimination of the mind cannot discriminate their individualities, yet, their phenomena are in substance; therefore, they are called phenomena that accompany with objective substance. Now, inasmuch as such phenomena are in substance, so they should not always in accordance with the function of discrimination; and inasmuch as the function of discrimination cannot discriminate their individualities, so they should not always in accord not always in accordance with substantial phenomena. Such kind of phenomena are just like people think that what have I heard and what have I seen are so and so.

Again, a different explanation about the three kinds of mental phenomena by Chi-Hsu[19] are as follows:

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(1)	The natural or unchangeable phenomena. “Natural means real, it indicates the mental phenomena which are produced by the seeds of mental phenomena therefore, they are called the real phenomena. And they can be divided into two classes: a) Without substance, i. e. the sense organs, the material world, and all seeds which are discriminated by the ālayavijñāna, so they are nothing but the transformations of alaya and discriminated by alaya. But, in regard to the material world and the sense organs of other people are inasmuch as the transformations of the seeds of vijnāna of the whole mankind, so we must admit that they are in substance. And, as for the realization of suchness by thefundamental wisdom, though it does not transform into mental phenomena, yet, it is also called the natural phenomena. b) Phenomena with substance: i.e. the present five kinds of object which are discriminated by the five senses; the first moment of the clear manovijnāna; and the phenomena of the result of samadhi, which are discriminated by the independent manovijñāna; they are all depending on the phenomena of alaya as their substance. Then they will become the phenomena of each individual vijñāna, just like various images that appear in a mirror: according to the categories of reality they are though like illusion or dream and without reality, yet, according to the ordinary categories they are phenomena of the five-vijñānas which are produced by seeds and will become seeds also; thus, they are different from flowers in the air, images in a mirror, or the hare’s horns and the tortoise’s hair, and also different from the unobtainable phenomena of past and future. Therefore, they are called the natural phenomena.
(2)	Phenomena of independent shadows. They are also divided into two classes: a) Only shadows without substance, just like the function of discrimination to discriminate on the tortoise’s hair and the hare’s horns. b) Independent shadows with substance, like one meditates according to the sutra, though it seems depend on the sutra as substance, yet, it is the shadows of independent manovijñāna after all.
(3)	Phenomena that accompany with objective substance. This kind of dhenomena are also divided into two classes: a) Phenomena that accompany with real objective substance, that is when the mind discriminates the mental phenomena; or the mano-vijnāna discriminates on all vijnānas and their qualities; and the seventh vijnāna discriminates on the function of discrimination of alayavijnāna. b) Phenomena that accompany with unreal objective substance, that is when the mind discriminates on unreal phenomena, like one meditates according to the sutra, which is not the real phenomena that are discriminatable by the five senses.

Again, according to ‘An extract from the Vidyāmātrasiddhi śāstra said: “The whole natural phenomena and a part of phenomena that accompany with objective snbstance are transformations of causes; while phenomena of independent shadows and a part of phenomena that accompany with objective substance are transformations of discrimination.”*[20] Thus, we may say that the natural phenomena are produced purely by causes; phenomena of independent shadows are produced purely by discrimination; and the phenomena that accompany with objective substance are produced by a mixture of causes and discrimination.

IV ON THE THEORY OF SEEDS AND FUMIGATION[21]

In order to establish the theory of transmigration in three periods with ceaseless cause and effect, the Yoga masters should firstly establish the theory of seeds and fumigation; and according to which they can also explain the possibility of gradual sanctification of an average man. The meaning of seeds indicates the content of the ālayavijñāna, in which the impressions of all phenomena and personal deeds which possess effective powers; just like corns put in the earch, when they get rain and sunlight they will grow into plants and then beat more seeds, and so are the seeds in ālayavijñāna.

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