A Controversy Unveiled:

Abstract

This paper discusses a controversy within the Ge-luk sect of Tibetan Buddhism concerning a disagreement among prominent Ge-luk scholars over the precise number of Buddhist doctrines indicated as requiring interpretation in Candrakīrti's Autocommentary on the “Introduction to Nāgārjuna's ‘Treatise on the Middle Way.'” The controversial passage comes in the sixth chapter of Candrakīrti's famous work on Buddhist philosophy in the context of his refutation of the Mind-Only system. The passage states:

These passages [in the Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra and so forth]

Show that other sūtras of such type require interpretation.

The controversy surrounds the fact that the founder of the Ge-luk sect, ºzong-ka-¸a Ío-sang-drak-¸a, asserts that Candrakīrti here refers to four types of sūtra passages:

(1)statements differentiating true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three natures;

(2)statements teaching a mind-basis-of-all;

(3)statements refuting external objects;

(4)statements explaining three final vehicles. Later Ge-luk authors—most notably Kay-drup and Jam-©ang-shay-¸a—argue instead that Candrakīrti is referring to five sūtra passages requiring interpretation, these being the four asserted by ºzong-ka-¸a plus a fifth: p. 208

(5)statements in the Tathāgata Essence Sūtra of a permanent, stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings having the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha.

Candrakīrti's remarks are somewhat ambiguous. Moreover, a surface reading yields doctrinal difficulties for ºzong-ka-¸a. Therefore, he employs a clever substitutional hermeneutic in treading the fine line between appreciation of Candrakīrti's opinions and outright non-adherence to his views. Kay-drup, on the other hand, rejects his master's conclusions as too limiting, while Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's hermeneutical maneuvers are an admirable attempt to reconcile the variant positions of his predecessors. Although these later Ge-luk-¸a's clearly feel ºzong-ka-¸a is mistaken, they never claim that he is wrong; they even take steps to smooth over their differences so that they do not appear to be disagreeing with the founder.

Within the course of investigating this disagreement, this paper shows how ºzong-ka-¸a employs creative interpretation in treading a fine line between appreciation of Candrakīrti's opinions on this point and outright non-adherence to his views. It also demonstrates how later exegetes—in part due to changing priorities within Tibet—are able to work with Sanskrit materials within ºzong-ka-¸a's doctrinal system, while at the same time circumventing ºzong-ka-¸a's strictures as needed. Also included is a discussion of the Ge-luk hermeneutical process, the author's translation of a small part of ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) “Introduction to (Nāgārjuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle'” dealing with this question of interpretable sūtras, and the author's translation of annotation za of Nga-Ûang-¸el-den's Annotations for (Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's) “Great Exposition of Tenets,” Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought.

關鍵詞： 1.Tibetan Buddhism 　2.Ge-luk Sect 　3. ºzong-ka-¸a 　4.Candrakīrti 　5.Hermeneutic 　6.Buddha Nature 　7.Interpretable and definitive scriptures

【Contents】

Introduction Ge-luk Hermeneutics Two Hermeneutical Sūtra Sources The Controversy ºzong-ka-¸a's Interpretation of Candrakīrti First Demonstration of Interpretability Second Demonstration of Interpretability Third Demonstration of Interpretability Fourth Demonstration of Interpretability Kay-drup and Jam-©ang-shay-¸a on Candrakīrti Conclusion Appendix A: Translation of the Illumination of the Thought Appendix B: Translation of Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations

Introduction

This paper[1] will unveil a polite but spirited controversy within the Ge-luk sect of Tibetan Buddhism. The controversy concerns disagreement among prominent Ge-luk scholars over the precise number of Buddhist doctrines indicated as requiring interpretation in Candrakīrti's[2] Autocommentary on the “Introduction to Nāgārjuna's ‘Treatise on the Middle Way.'”[3] The controversial passage comes in the sixth chapter of Candrakīrti's famous work on Buddhist philosophy in the context of his refutation of the Mind-Only system. The passage states:[4]

These passages [in the Descent Into Laṅkā Sūtra[5] and so forth] Show that other sūtras of such type require interpretation.

In brief, the controversy surrounds the fact that the founder of the Ge-luk sect, ºzong-ka-¸a Ío-sang-drak-¸a,[6] asserts that Candrakīrti here refers to four types of sūtra passages:

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(1)statements differentiating true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three natures;

(2)statements teaching a mind-basis-of-all;

(3)statements refuting external objects;

(4)statements explaining three final vehicles. Later Ge-luk authors—most notably Kay-drup[7] and Jam-©ang-shay-¸a[8]—argue instead that Candrakīrti is referring to five sūtra passages requiring interpretation, these being the four asserted by ºzong-ka-¸a plus a fifth:

(5)statements in the Tathāgata Essence Sūtra of a permanent, stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings having the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha.

Candrakīrti's remarks are somewhat ambiguous. Moreover, as we shall see, a surface reading yields doctrinal difficulties for ºzong-ka-¸a. Therefore, this creative scholar employs a clever substitutional hermeneutic in treading the fine line between appreciation of Candrakīrti's opinions and outright non-adherence to his views. Kay-drup, on the other hand, rejects his master's conclusions as too limiting, while Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's hermeneutical maneuvers are an admirable attempt to reconcile the variant positions of his predecessors. Although these later Ge-luk-¸a's clearly feel ºzong-ka-¸a is mistaken, they never claim that he is wrong; they even take steps to smooth over their differences so that they do not appear to be disagreeing with the founder.

Within the course of investigating this disagreement, I hope to show how ºzong-ka-¸a employs creative interpretation in treading a fine line between

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appreciation of Candrakīrti's opinions on this point and outright non-adherence to his views. I also hope to show how later exegetes—in part due to changing priorities within Tibet—are able to work with Sanskrit materials within ºzong-ka-¸a's doctrinal system, while at the same time circumventing ºzong-ka-¸a's strictures as needed. Unveiling this controversy will also prove valuable as a discussion of interpretable and definitive doctrines and as a demonstration of the Ge-luk hermeneutical process, not merely on a theoretical level but as it actually evolves over time.

In order to facilitate understanding of this controversy, I also include two appendices: (1) my translation of a small part of ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) “Introduction to (Nāgārjuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle'”[9] dealing with this question of interpretable sūtras and (2) my translation of annotation za of Nga-Ûang-¸el-den's[10] Annotations for (Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's) “Great Exposition of Tenets,” Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious Jewel of Clear Thought.[11] Toward that end, let us look briefly at the topic of Ge-luk hermeneutics to discover which sūtra passages are considered definitive and which are held to be of interpretable meaning according to Ge-luk exegetes.

Ge-luk Hermeneutics

Broadly speaking, hermeneutics is method or strategy employed in interpretation. In discussing the need for hermeneutical strategy, Packer presents Heidegger's proposition to the effect that, “hermeneutic method is the appropriate approach for

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the study of human action”.[12] He explains that the hermeneutical approach is essential since, “any act, looked at in isolation from its situation, is likely to be ambiguous to the point of opacity”, and that, furthermore, “an observer of a social interaction does not have direct, unproblematic access to the unambiguous ‘meaning' of the acts taking place.”

This assessment by Packer of the ambiguity of events observed in isolation describes the problem facing Buddhist hermeneuticians confronted with conflicting literal readings found in different sūtras. Although an ambiguity of events may necessitate a hermeneutic, this is not to say, as Carl Bielefeldt seems to think, that Buddhist hermeneutics “is a sign of alienation, of distance from a tradition that Buddhist thinkers felt the need to somehow recover”.[13] Rather, the very nature of the Buddha's teaching necessitates a hermeneutic. Buddhist hermeneutics is integral to a system whose Founder spoke different things for the benefit of different people. Since the death of the Buddha, Buddhist scholars have relied upon hermeneutical enquiry to inform their ontological studies. This hermeneutical need is based on the fact that the Buddha spoke both interpretable and definitive teachings, and therefore reliance upon sūtra alone is not possible. To realize the nature of reality in all its profundity, one must rely on “stainless reasoning,” and in part this means one must also rely on treatise authors who employ reason to discriminate between interpretable and definitive sūtra passages. This need is ahistorical because Buddhist hermeneutics is a tradition encouraged by the Buddha and therefore is a planned addition to the tradition rather than a sign of alienation or distance from it. Thus, there is no “distance from a tradition that Buddhist thinkers felt the need to somehow recover”.

Just prior to his nirvāṇa, the Buddha addressed his community about how to comport itself after his death. Here, in the Mahāparinibbannasutta, the Buddha instructs the community through Ānanda to accept the doctrine as their teacher:[14]

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Then the Bhagavan addressed the venerable Ānanda: “It may be, Ānanda, that some of you will think, ‘The word of the Teacher is a thing of the past; we have now no Teacher.' But that, Ānanda, is not the correct view. The Doctrine and the Discipline, Ānanda, which I have taught and enjoined upon you is to be your teacher when I am gone”.

The Buddha informs Ānanda that his departure will deprive the community of a living teacher, but will not deprive them of the doctrine: a scriptual authority they should regard as their teacher. Here, the Buddha lays the foundation for a hermeneutic that will be needed after his death: a time that will lack the omniscient authority of the Buddha himself but which will still posess scriptural authority. According to Lopez, this injunction by the Buddha is the basis of Buddhist hermeneutics in that it addresses the dilemma of a congregation subsequent to the death of its Founder, and establishes principles for the retrieval of his meaning.[15]

Like Lopez, Nathan Katz feels that Buddhist hermeneutics is aimed at providing meaningful access to both scriptures and practices. [16] He presents a division of Buddhist hermeneutics into the text-based and the adept-based that is in part defined by hermeneutical flow. He theorizes that the text-based hermeneutician seeks to analyze a teaching, while the adept-based hermeneutician seeks to analyze the practitioner of that teaching, and through this the efficacy of the practice.

Ge-luk-¸a hermeneuticians employ interpretation of scripture more in accordance with Katz's first division, the text-based. This is because the Ge-luk method always seeks to analyze a teaching, and emphasizes a logical approach to doctrinal and textual analysis of scriptures. ¼am-©ang-shay-¸a states that this enterprise proceeds through determining in three ways which sūtra passages are interpretable and which are definitive:

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1.by the four reliances: (1) rely on the teaching, not the teacher, (2) rely on the meaning, not the letter, (3) rely on the definitive, not the interpretable, and (4) rely on wisdom, not [ordinary] consciousness;

2.by reasoning and analysis;

3.through many scriptural citations in treatises.

Determining the interpretable and the definitive is the specific meaning of hermeneutics in Great Vehicle Buddhism. ¼am-©ang-shay-¸a states:

The differentiation of what requires interpretation and what is definitive is devised from the viewpoint of the subject matter [in the passage]. A sutra mainly teaching the ultimate [emptiness] is said to be definitive whereas one mainly teaching conventionalities [phenomena other than emptiness] is said to require interpretation. The Teaching of Akshayamati Sutra says, “What are definitive sutras? Which require interpretation? Sutras setting forth the establishment of conventionalities are called ‘requiring interpretation'. Sutras setting forth the establishment of the ultimate are called ‘definitive'.”[17]

Figuratively speaking, Ricoeur could be describing the Ge-luk situation when he remarks:

It is useful to recall that the hermeneutical problem was first raised within the limits of exegesis, that is, within the framework of a discipline which proposes to understand a text—to understand it beginning with its intention, on the basis of what it attempts to say.[18]

Thus, Ricoeur and Ge-luk hermeneuticians are alike in that they consider that a hermeneutical framework is employed in order to understand a text, beginning with

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its intention. Ricouer goes on to say that different philosophical presuppositions and principles result in different interpretations. This was certainly true in Tibet, as well as in other Buddhist countries, where religious scholars disagreed over which sūtra passages were to be taken as being of definitive meaning[19] and which were to be taken as being of interpretable meaning[20] (regarding selflessness). Their purpose was to identify definitive scriptures in order to progress toward a direct realization of the ultimate. Since this realization is necessary for enlightenment, correct knowledge of the ultimate reality taught in scripture is part of the process of enlightenment. Hence, interpretation of scripture can be seen as a crucial step in the soteriological process. The Buddhist search for the “most exalted vision of the Buddha,” the actual “content of his enlightenment”, assures that identification of the Buddha's intention lies at the heart of the Buddhist hermeneutic.[21] Broido agrees with this assessment when he remarks that the Buddhist hermeneutical enterprise is founded upon “intention-ascription.”[22] As Lopez notes in his essay, “This concern with intention may very well run counter to modern trends in hermeneutics, but its centrality to the Buddhist interpretation of scripture is undeniable.”[23]

However, Ge-luk hermeneutical strategy is more than a search for intention. In fact, the intended meaning is only one of four criteria used in determining the interpretable and the definitive. Let us consider Ge-luk hermeneutical strategies and their sūtra sources.

Two Hermeneutical Sūtra Sources

The hermeneutical enterprise seeks the intention of the Buddha, but how is that to be determined? In Tibet, ºzong-ka-¸a's Treatise Differentiating the Interpretable and the Definitive: The Essence of Eloquence[24] is a model for later Ge-luk scholars

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acceptance that Proponents of Mind-Only rely on the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought[25] for their scriptural-based hermeneutic of the three wheels. Middle Way exegetes following the principals set forth in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought employed a number of hermeneutical tools based on this Mind-Only sūtra to establish the Buddha's intention in terms of four criteria: [26]

1.the intended meaning;[27]

2.the basis in the Buddha's thought;[28]

3.the purpose;[29]

4.the damage to the literal teaching.[30]

The intended meaning is that which the Buddha is attempting to convey. In an interpretable scripture, this meaning is different from the Buddha's own understanding of the ultimate. The Buddha's understanding of the ultimate is termed the basis in the Buddha's thought. This is always emptiness, the ontological ultimate, the mode of subsistence of phenomena. The purpose is the reason or motivation that caused the Buddha to speak interpretably. This motivation is based on his omniscient understanding of the needs of his listeners. For instance, a possible motivation for discussing ethics is to provide a means for connecting causes to effects for those who cannot understand the Middle Way presentation of causality. A motivation for discussing mind-only is to help trainees overcome attachment to forms, and so forth. The damage to the literal teaching refers to the

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contradictions (by reason and scripture) that would follow if the interpretable reading were allowed to stand without interpretation. For example, if one accepted the literal teaching of the five aggregates as definitive that would contradict reasonings proving emptiness to be the definitive ultimate (and not some conventional phenomena). Hopkins remarks that a passage is said to require interpretation due to having the latter three of the above four factors.[31]

Within Great Vehicle tenet systems, both Proponents of Mind-Only and, to a lesser extent, Proponents of the Middle Way make use of the explanation in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and other sūtras for a hermeneutical grid of three wheels of scripture. The Sūtra Unraveling the Thought makes its division into three wheels by way of subject matter; specifically, by way of how selflessness is presented.[32] Hopkins states that:

The first turning is comprised of doctrines that set forth the selflessness of persons but do not refute that phenomena are established by way of their own character as bases of names and conceptions. The second is comprised of those that on the literal level set forth the non-true existence of all phenomena, without distinguishing that some do and others do not truly exist. The third is comprised of those that clearly discriminate the true existence of emptinesses and impermanent phenomena and the non-true existence of imaginary phenomena.[33]

The three wheels are shown to be different by nature of the very different presentations of selflessness contained within them. Thus, the differentiation into three wheels is not made according to some other criterion, such as time or place. Kay-drup makes this very point:

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The three wheels [of doctrine] mentioned in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are not posited by way of the assemblies of [the Buddha's] retinue, or by way of periods in the Teacher's life, and so forth, but by way of expressed topics. Furthermore, those are in terms of the [three] mode of settling the meaning of selflessness: (1) an explanation that mostly does not refute true existence, (2) an explanation that all phenomena are without true existence, and (3) a good differentiation of true existence with respect to the three natures. [This differentiation of] three wheels is done in terms of the fact that they respectively teach such.[34]

Thurman, on the other hand, states that the hermeneutics of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and Zhiyi's five period hermeneutic are similar in being “historical in using the Buddha's biography as framework”.[35] Adherents to this ‘historical' theory might agree with Packer when he says that hermeneutics is “not a search for timeless and ahistorical laws and formal structures.”[36] However, these theories are not those held by ºzong-ka-¸a, for whom reasoning might well be said to constitute “a search for timeless and ahistorical laws”. ºzong-ka-¸a further states:

The differentiation of interpretable and definitive scriptures set forth stemming from the ultimate derives from whether there is or is not damage by reasoning to the literal reading.[37]

ºzong-ka-¸a again mentions reasoning as the prime means of eliciting the definitive,

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thereby identifying the ultimate through hermeneutical interpretation. This also contradicts Thurman, who does not hold that the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought differentiates the interpretable and the definitive by reason, but by periods in the Buddha's life.[38]

Proponents of the Middle Way and Proponents of Mind-Only interpret the sūtras of these three wheels of doctrine differently. From the Ge-luk perspective, at least, Proponents of Mind-Only following the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought employ literal acceptability as the criterion for definitive sūtras.[39]

Proponents of the Middle Way assert that the second wheel is of definitive meaning, while the other two wheels are interpretable. Proponents of Mind-Only hold the final wheel to be of definitive meaning and the first two to be of interpretable meaning. How is this differentiation to be made? ºzong-ka-¸a says in The Essence of the Good Explanations:

the differentiation [between the interpretable and the definitive] must be made just by stainless reasoning … because the suchness of things also has reasoned proofs which are establishments by way of [logical] correctness.[40]

ºzong-ka-¸a comes down on the side of reasoning as the final criterion of the interpretable and the definitive. This criterion applies equally to both schools of the Great Vehicle. In essence, ºzong-ka-¸a is saying that all practitioners should employ reasoning in the hermeneutical process to determine for themselves which statements are definitive. Thus, it is the Ge-luk position that differentiation into three wheels is made by way of topics expressed, these topics being three different presentations of selflessness.

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Proponents of the Middle Way School rely for their hermeneutic on the Teaching of Aksayamati Sūtra.[41] This sūtra specifies that the differentiation between scriptures of definitive and interpretable meaning is made by way of the subject discussed. This means that those scriptures teaching emptiness are definitive, whereas those teaching conventional truths are interpretable. ¼am-©ang-shay-¸a quotes the Teaching of Aksayamati Sūtra to this effect:[42]

The Teaching of Akshayamati Sūtra says:

Those sutras teaching [about various objects] by way of various words and letters are said to require interpretation. Those teaching the profound, the difficult to view, and the difficult to realize are called definitive. Those teaching, for instance, [the inherent existence of] an owner when there is no [inherently existent] owner and teaching those objects indicated by various words [such as] self, sentient being, life, nourishment, being, person, progeny of Manu, son of Manu, agent, and experiencer are said to require interpretation. Those sutras teaching the doors of liberation, the emptiness of phenomena, no [inherently existent] signs, no [inherently existent] wishes, no [inherently existent] products, no [inherently existent] production, no [inherently existent] sentient being, no [inherently existent] living being, no [inherently existent] person, and no [inherently existent] controller are called the definitive. This is called reliance on definitive sutras and non-reliance on those requiring interpretation.

The teachings of conventional phenomena in the first wheel of the teaching and in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought require interpretation. For, it is necessary to search out the mode of existence [of the phenomena mentioned in these texts] apart from what was explicitly taught there. The King of Meditative Stabilizations Sūtra, the One Hundred Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra, and so forth are definitive because the mode of existence of the phenomena [discussed in those texts] is definite as just the meaning of their explicit teaching.

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Ge-luk hermeneuticians traditionally rely on the The Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra for a radical ontological hermeneutic that ignores such questions as “authorial intention, contextual circumstance, expediency, and literal acceptability.” [43] Instead, the The Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra defines the interpretable and the definitive strictly in terms of the ontological status of the subject matter. Sūtras teaching conventional truths are interpretable, sūtras referring to the ultimate are definitive. Candrakīrti clearly restates this position in his Autocommentary (VI.97):

Interpretation is undertaken upon knowing the application of scripture

And understanding that sūtras which teach what is not reality

Are said to require interpretation.

Know [that sūtras] having the meaning of emptiness are definitive.[44]

Lopez suggests that the radical ontological hermeneutic of The Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra “provides an element of distanciation which the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought lacks, because it provides a disinterested approach in the determination of the interpretable and the definitive. Since the only hermeneutical criteria for definitiveness is emptiness, the hermeneutical enterprise is accessible to anyone capable of following Nāgārjuna's analyses. Candrakīrti points out that providing access to the hermeneutic was the very purpose for which Nāgārjuna wrote his Treatise:

Some have the doubt: “what is the teaching that has the meaning of reality? Which are intentional?” Some, because of their feeble minds, think that teachings that are of interpretable meaning are of definitive meaning. In order to clear away doubt and mistaken ideas of both of these through reasoning and scripture, the master composed this [Treatise].[45]

Thus, Nāgārjuna composed his treatise to dispel wrong ideas regarding the

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interpretable and the definitive. It is interesting to note that, for Consequentialists, definitive scriptures teaching emptiness need not do so on the literal level of what the words actually say. The criterion in that school is that a sūtra's actual subject of discussion[46] and explicit teaching[47] be that phenomena are empty of inherent existence.[48] Such a sūtra is the Heart of Wisdom Sūtra,[49] that says on the literal reading that forms do not exist.

The radical ontological hermeneutic of the The Teachings of Aksayamati Sūtra is the rationale for verifying that sūtras teaching Middle Way Consequence emptiness are definitive. As Lopez remarks, “the interpreter, ironically, participates in a hermeneutics of suspicion, in the case of interpretable scriptures, allowing the Buddha's statement its illocutionary function but denying its perlocutionary effect; acknowledging his words but being unpersuaded by them.”[50] It is Lopez' contention that, in response to this situation, fraught with suspicion and the tension of disregarding the word of the Buddha, the “commentary becomes the endless search for a meaning that can be discerned once and for all, free from sectarian concerns.”[51] This is because “there is no escape from the text,” since even the authority of the treatise authors circles back to their being prophesied in sūtra.

In a sense there is circularity in the Ge-luk hermeneutic: sūtra pronouncements are employed to determine the interpretable and the definitive of sūtras. However, reliance on scripture is only part of the process of determining the interpretable and the definitive. The “stainless reasoning” mentioned by ºzong-ka-¸a is also an integral part of the Ge-luk hermeneutic because emptiness has reasoned proofs that establish it by way of logical correctness. Even if modern scholars doubt the

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autonomy of reasoning in Buddhism, or the ultimate validity of inferential realizations, it seems clear that Middle Way exegetes do not. For them, syllogistic analysis breaks the circularity and releases them from the text. The analysis itself bestows freedom from the text through empirically validating—with cognitions arisen from inferential understandings—the emptiness that is at the core of definitive sūtras. Lopez may be discounting the possibility of inferential realization when he asserts of the Ge-luk hermeneutic, “there is no escape from the text.”

It is certainly true, however, that the Buddhist hermeneutical tradition is fairly fixed after two thousand years of exegesis. There are no surprises in Buddhist hermeneutics. Because of this, the Ge-luk exploration of the interpretable and the definitive is unlike Gadamer's notion of an exegete's project, “which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning.”[52] The Buddhist exegete may misunderstand the profound meaning, but there will not be a constant revision of what is definitive and what requires interpretation.

Lopez also speaks of the Ge-luk hermeneutic involving an endless search for meaning. As we have seen, the syllogistic reasoning of treatise analysis is the conscious structure of the Middle Way Consequence hermeneutic. Since the Ge-luk hermeneutic is based on the syllogism, it seems to me to be a finite—not an endless—search for meaning; a search confined within the boundaries of Buddhist logic, wherein a statement can be proven correct by relating a thesis with the three modes of a correct sign.[53]

The Controversy

I first became aware of the controversy through Nga-Ûang-¸el-den's Annotations note za (see Appendix B). There, Nga-Ûang-¸el-den comments upon a controversial position held by Jam-©ang-shay-¸a that is a significant diversion from the position held by ºzong-ka-¸a. As stated above, the basic controversy involves a dispute over the number of doctrines that are proved to require interpretation according to a passage in Candrakīrti's Autocommentary. The difference in positions appears minor,

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but is not: ºzong-ka-¸a holds that Candrakīrti is speaking of four types of sūtra passages (describing four different Mind-only doctrines), all from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought and all considered definitive by Proponents of Mind-Only, these being:

(1)statements differentiating true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three natures,

(2)statements teaching a mind-basis-of-all,

(3)statements refuting external objects,

(4)statements explaining three final vehicles. Jam-©ang-shay-¸a, on the other hand, argues instead that Candrakīrti is referring to five types of sūtra passages requiring interpretation, the four given above plus another:

(5)statements in the Tathāgata Essence Sūtra of a permanent, stable essence in the continuums of all sentient beings that has the [major and minor] marks of a Buddha.

Jam-©ang-shay-¸a includes this extra category of sūtra passage even though he does not hold that this category is accepted as definitive by Proponents of Mind-Only. Thus, he appears to be abandoning one of ºzong-ka-¸a's criteria for inclusion in this list: that such sūtra passages are necessarily held to be definitive in the Mind-Only School.

Before we examine the maneuvers employed on both sides of this controversy, it might be helpful to look at the entire passage in question from Candrakīrti's Autocommentary [194]:[54]

Qualm: Indeed, you have explained the meaning of the Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds] in this way, but even so, also in another scripture, mind-only [is said to] definitely exist. This is because the [Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra]

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states:

[Objects] do not exist as external objects as perceived.

The mind appears as various [objects through the power of predispositions].

[Because the mind is generated] in the likeness of bodies, [senses], enjoyments, and abodes [physical sense organs and environments],

I have explained [that all phenomena are] mind-only. [55]

Here “bodies” are the sense spheres, eye and so forth; “enjoyments” are the objects, forms and so forth; “abodes” are the world of the environment.

Because there are no external objects aside from mind, only mere consciousness is generated appearing as bodies, enjoyments, and abodes, at which time bodies, etc. —that abide as things that are objects—manifest as different from consciousness as if they are externalities. Therefore, “These three realms are mind-only.”

Answer: In order to describe this sūtra also as having a thought behind it, [the root text] says:

These sūtras teaching no external objects of perception, Teaching that the mind appears as the variety of objects... .[56]

The thought behind these [sūtra passages teaching no external objects is that they]:

Turn away from forms those extremely attracted to forms. These also require interpretation.[57]

[195] Regarding those [sūtra passages teaching no external objects], they require interpretation. It should be known that:

To those people having great hope in forms, who become involved powerlessly by way of the attachment, anger, pride, and so forth that are

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caused by that [hope] and who commit great sins through adhering to such [attachment and so forth], and who fall from the collections of merit and wisdom, the Supramundane Victor—for the sake of their overcoming the afflictive emotions causally compelled by forms—teaches mind-only as if it were so, though it is not so, similar to his teaching of [meditation on] skeletons to desirous persons to overcome their desire for external objects.

Qualm: How is it ascertained that this scripture requires interpretation and is not definitive?

Answer: [It is established] from scripture and reasoning. To indicate this [the root text says]:

This was said by the Teacher just to require interpretation, And that this requires interpretation is [also] proven by reasoning.[58]

Not only is this sūtra one that requires interpretation, but others also [require interpretation]:

These passages [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, etc.,] show That other Sūtras of such type require interpretation. [59]

What are the “[other] such passages [that require interpretation?” The teaching of the non-true] existence of imputational natures and the [true] existence of other-powered natures that occurs in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought when explaining the three natures: imputational natures, other-powered natures, and thoroughly established natures. [196] Similarly, [the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought teaches]:

There is a deep and subtle consciousness, the taker [of rebirth],

Having all the seeds and flowing like the continuum of a river.

If it were understood as a self, it would not be proper,

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Thus I do not teach it to children. [60]

And so forth.[61] [The Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra] says:

Just as a doctor distributes

Medicines to the ill,

So the Buddha teaches

Mind-only to sentient beings. [62]

Through this passage [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra the teaching of mind-only] is clarified as requiring interpretation. Similarly, [the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra says]:

[Mahāmati said,] “The Tathāgatagarbha that was taught in the Supramundane Victor's sūtras was said by the Supramundane Victor to be naturally radiant, pure, and hence begininglessly pure, possessing the thirty-two characteristics [of a Buddha], and existing in the bodies of all sentient-beings.

“The Supramundane Victor said that like a precious gem wrapped in a dirty cloth, the Tathāgatagarbha is wrapped in the cloth of the aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres, overwhelmed by the force of desire, hatred, and ignorance, and sullied with the defilements of conceptuality. [197]

“If so, Supramundane Victor, how is this propounding of a Tathāgatagarbha not like the Forders'[63] propounding of a self? Supramundane Victor, the Forders teach and propound a self that is permanent, a non-agent, without the qualities, pervasive and non-perishing.”

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The Supramundane Victor said, “Mahāmati, this teaching of a Tathāgatagarbha is not like the Forders' propounding of a self. O Mahāmati, the completely perfect Buddhas, Tathāgata Foe Destroyers, teach a Tathāgatagarbha meaning emptiness, the final reality, nirvāṇa, no [inherently existent] production, signlessness, wishlessness, and so forth. So that children might avoid the fear of selflessness, they teach through the means of a Tathāgatagarbha the state of non-conceptuality, the object [of the wisdom] free from appearances.

“Mahāmati, future and present Bodhisattvas—the great beings—should not adhere to this as a self. Mahāmati, for example, a potter makes a variety of vessels out of one mass of clay particles with his hands, manual skill, a rod, water, thread, and mental dexterity. Mahāmati, similarly, whether the Tathāgatas—through their various [techniques] having wisdom and skill in means—teach the selflessness of phenomena that overcomes all entities of conceptuality, [198] as the Tathāgatagarbha or as selflessness, they, like a potter, teach with various formats of words and letters. Hence, it is in that way, Mahāmati, that I teach the Tathāgatagarbha. How could those who fall into a view conceiving of a real self come to be endowed with thought dwelling on the objects of activity of the three liberations[64] and become manifestly and completely purified in complete perfect enlightenment?”[65]

Also, in the same sūtra this is taught:

Mahāmati, I teach that the characteristics of emptiness, non-production, non-duality, and no inherent nature are contained in the sūtras of all the Buddhas.[66]

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Therefore, in that way, all Sūtras of such type that are asserted to be of definitive meaning by Proponents of Mind-Only are clarified as requiring interpretation through these passages [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra].

In this passage from Candrakīrti's Autocommentary a number of sūtra passages have been indicated to require interpretation by the passages cited from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra.[67] Before discussing Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's opinion regarding this passage in the Autocommentary, let us look at the specific passages indicated by Candrakīrti's verse and commentary, along with ºzong-ka-¸a's opinion on which sūtra passages are implied by Candrakīrti but not explicitly mentioned. Nga-Ûang-¸el-den's discussion of the controversy will also be noted.

ºzong-ka-¸a's Interpretation of Candrakīrti

The context of the controversy is Candrakīrti's refutation, in chapter six of the Autocommentary, of Mind-Only teachings of no external objects. Candrakīrti states the Middle Way Consequence School position on the interpretable nature of these Mind-Only teachings of no external objects in his root verse VI.94:

These sūtras teaching no external objects of perception,

Teaching that the mind appears as the variety of objects,

Turn away from forms those extremely attracted to forms.

These also require interpretation.[68]

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Candrakīrti uses scripture and reasoning to show that the teaching of mind-only requires interpretation. The scripture passage that he cites is from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra:

To those people having great hope in forms, who become involved powerlessly by way of the attachment, anger, pride, and so forth that are caused by that [hope] and who commit great sins through adhering to such [attachment and so forth], and who fall from the collections of merit and wisdom, the Supramundane Victor, for the sake of their overcoming the afflictive emotions causally compelled by forms, teaches mind-only as if it were so, though it is not so, similar to his teaching of [meditation on] skeletons to desirous persons to overcome their desire for external objects.[69]

By citing this quote from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, Candrakīrti is explaining the Middle Way Consequence position that Mind-Only sūtras refuting external forms are interpretable and were spoken for the benefit of persons having extreme attachment to forms, and hence are not definitive.[70] Candrakīrti then remarks that scripture and reasoning also show that “other Sūtras of such type,” taken by Proponents of Mind-Only to be definitive, require interpretation:[71]

These passages [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, etc.,] show That other Sūtras of such type require interpretation.

“Sūtras of such type” refers to passages that:

(1)are spoken for a purpose in order to lead certain trainees and

(2)are considered to require interpretation by the Middle Way Consequence School and to be definitive by Proponents of Mind-Only.

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Having shown that mind-only requires interpretation, Candrakīrti employs a practical but poorly structured method of showing that other sūtras require interpretation. He explicitly mentions that two teachings require interpretation, and then quotes three passages from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra indicating that these passages demonstrate that those teachings require interpretation. The argument, made somewhat confusing by Candrakīrti's separating its parts, may be restructured into the following four demonstrations of interpretability:

Conclusion

Now that the controversy has been unveiled, I suspect there are those who regard it as scholastic quibbling over an insignificant point of doctrine. After all, the actual passage by Candrakīrti under discussion is only four words! However, there is far more substance here than meets the eye. At stake is the entire edifice of ºzong-ka-¸a's refutation of the Other Emptiness of Döl-¸o-¸a Áhay-rap-gyel-tsen. For, if Döl-¸o-¸a Áhay-rap-gyel-tsen is correct in asserting that the teaching of the permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is definitive in the Mind-Only School, then ºzong-ka-¸a's assertion that the Jo-nang view is heterodox cannot be upheld. Although ºzong-ka-¸a never explicitly makes this point, we can understand its central importance to him when he paraphrases the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra:

[The Buddha] said that present and future Bodhisattvas are not to adhere to this permanent stable [tathāgata]garbha as a self. If one holds to the literal reading, it is similar to the Forders conception of self; hence, one should not adhere [to the teaching of a permanent stable tathāgatagarbha] as literal.[100]

For ºzong-ka-¸a, the Other Emptiness view of Döl-¸o-¸a Áhay-rap-gyel-tsen is not a possible Buddhist view: it is a positive phenomena, not a negative. Since ºzong-ka-¸a proves in the Essence of Eloquence and elsewhere that the ultimate in both the Mind-Only School and the Middle Way School is a negative phenomenon, it is therefore quite impossible (from his point of view) that the teaching of a positive—the permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha—could be definitive in any Great Vehicle school

Not only is this controversy important for ºzong-ka-¸a's presentation of emptiness, it is also highly instructive insofar as it demonstrates Ge-luk hermeneutics in action. For instance, for me the fireworks of Ge-luk thought sparkle entertainingly when ºzong-ka-¸a asserts that when Candrakīrti brings up the topic of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha he is actually talking about the mind-basis-of-all and is not speaking of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha at all! As we have

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seen, ºzong-ka-¸a resorts to this exegetical maneuver due to his overriding concern for the doctrinal integrity of his system. Here, Candrakīrti's apparent meaning yields to ºzong-ka-¸a's determination to refute the Jo-nang-¸a assertion that a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is definitive for Proponents of Mind-Only.

Kay-drup and Jam-©ang-shay-¸a do not display the same anxious concern for thoroughly excluding teachings of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha from the list of sūtras shown to be interpretable on this occasion in Candrakīrti's text, even though such teachings do not follow ºzong-ka-¸a's criterion of being definitive for Mind-Only. More intellectual fireworks are forthcoming, however when—instead of employing ºzong-ka-¸a's creative substitution by turning Candrakīrti's citation of the teaching of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha into a citation concerned with the mind-basis-of-all—Jam-©ang-shay-¸a follows Candrakīrti's own explanation and includes the teaching of such a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha among those shown to require interpretation. He then employs creative logic to claim that Candrakīrti did not hold that in the Mind-Only School such a teaching was accepted literally despite Candrakīrti's seeming to say so. He does this by claiming that it is not Candrakīrti's intention to say that all these five are held to be definitive by Mind-Only, but that whichever are so held are necessarily interpretable for Proponents of the Middle Way. In this way Jam-©ang-shay-¸a is able to disagree with ºzong-ka-¸a's reading of Candrakīrti's text while veiling his disagreement behind a creative hermeneutic.

This controversy also illustrates well the workings of exegetical politics within Ge-luk by showing eminent Ge-luk scholars enfolding foundational Sanskrit philosophical materials into ºzong-ka-¸a's doctrinal system, while circumventing ºzong-ka-¸a's strictures as needed. It is characteristic of these scholars that they never fail to confine their disagreements within doctrinal parameters set forth in Candrakīrti's text. If such confinement requires creative and often innovative interpretation to ensure the coherence and consistency of the Ge-luk-¸a system, the Ge-luk authors we have consulted are not afraid to proceed creatively.

Appendix A: Translation of the Illumination of the Thought

[The following is my translation of the section of ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought, Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) “Introduction to (Nāgājuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle'”[101] commenting on Candrakīrti's Autocommentary, verses VI.94-95 and commentary.]

Appendix B: Translation of Nga-wang-bel-den's Annotations

[The following is my translation of annotation za from the Consequence section of Nga-Ûang-¸el-den's Annotations.]

Annotation Za—Other Sūtras of Such Type Require Interpretation

Thus, Candrakīrti's Introduction [VI.95] says:

These passages [in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra and so forth]

Show that other sūtras of such type require interpretation.[112]

Whatever is a sūtra [i.e., passage of scripture] to be commented upon as of interpretable meaning that is explicitly indicated in [Candrakīrti's text where it says] “other sūtras of such type”, is necessarily asserted by Proponents of Mind Only to be of definitive meaning and is necessarily a passage in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought. This is because such is stated very clearly in ºzong-ka-¸a's Extensive Explanation of (Candrakīrti's) “Introduction to (Nāgārjuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle,' ”[113] which says:

“Sūtras of such type” are not the two passages of the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra just cited, since neither of these are asserted by Proponents of Mind Only to be of definitive meaning, and because earlier, in Candrakīrti's Commentary he clearly describes them as [from] the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought.

Also [such is stated in] ºzong-ka-¸a's The Essence of the Good Explanations which says:

“Sūtras of such type” are those as described earlier to be from the Sūtra

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Unraveling the Thought; [Candrakīrti] is not indicating that sūtras which teach a Tathāgatagarbha [and which are actually of] interpretable meaning are asserted as being of definitive meaning by Proponents of Mind Only. Neither Proponents of Mind-Only nor Proponents of the Middle Way disagree about this.

Therefore, the four sets of sūtra passages to be commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning are the four sets of sūtra passages in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, these being the explanations (1) differentiating the three natures as to whether they are truly existent or not (2) teaching the existence of a mind-basis-of-all (3) refuting external objects (4) and setting forth three final vehicles. [125]

Objection: [What you have just said] contradicts [Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's] earlier explanation that the statement that the sūtras to be commented upon on as of interpretable meaning on this occasion are four-fold is a condensation into four by way of topics, and that if they are divided by way of the words that are the means of expression there are a great many.

Reply: [Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's] earlier explanation of such was in consideration [of the fact] that when the four sets of passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought are explained as being of interpretable meaning, passages in the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned, the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra, the Sūtra on the Myrabolan Fruit, and the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras which accord with them in terms of how the topics are taught also implicitly can be understood to be non-literal. Hence there is no contradiction.

Objection: If it is said that whatever is

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a sūtra to be commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning must be any of the four sets of sūtra passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, then that is incorrect. For, sūtras which teach a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha are explained in Kay-drup's Thousand Intervals, Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's Great Exposition of Tenets (root text and commentary), and Jam-©ang-shay-¸a's Decisive Analysis of (Candrakīrti's) “Introduction to (Nāgārjuna's) ‘Treatise on the Middle'” as being sūtras commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning.

Reply: [That they said this] does not entail [that it is incorrect that whatever is a sūtra to be commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning must be any of the four sets of sūtra passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought], because such statements, taking the passage from the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra that explains that the teaching of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is of interpretable meaning as their source, are made in consideration that sūtras teaching a mind-basis-of-all are to be commented upon as requiring interpretation. However, teachings of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha are not teachings that are commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning. This is because Proponents of Mind Only do not assert such as being of definitive meaning.

This is because the entailment [that whatever is a sūtra to be commented upon on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning must be any of the four sets of sūtra passages from the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] is established by the earlier citation of the passage in ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought,[114] and the purpose of commenting upon these sūtras on this occasion as being of interpretable meaning is for the purpose of refuting the Mind Only system.

Moreover, sūtras [teaching] a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha are not posited as being sūtras to be commented upon on as being of interpretable meaning on this occasion [of Candrakīrti's text]. This is because ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought says:

This system [of the Consequence School] comments on all four meaning-sets, which were explained earlier, as being of interpretable meaning, but does not do it in accordance with those who comment on some of those as being of interpretable meaning and some as being of definitive meaning.

This is a statement that there are four sūtras to be commented upon as interpretable on this occasion. Also, even a corner of a statement that there are five sūtra passages does not exist in either the Illumination of the Thought or The Essence of Good Explanations.

Moreover, all four sūtra sets, such as those, are commented upon as being of interpretable meaning and are stated not in a context of differentiating some into

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interpretable and some into definitive in accordance with the father, Śāntaraksita, and his spiritual son [Kamalaśīla].[115] [126]

Therefore, with respect to the meaning of the words of this passage from Candrakīrti's Autocommentary:

The other sūtras of such type that are asserted by Proponents of Mind-Only to be of definitive meaning are the four sūtra passages in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought that (1) speak within differentiating true existence and the absence of true existence with respect to the three characters, (2) teach a mind-basis-of-all, which is “an appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle...”[116], (3) refute external objects, and (4) speak of three final vehicles. From among those four sūtra passages [of the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought], the first three are shown to be of interpretable meaning respectively by these three passages in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra: (1) the teaching that the character of an absence of inherent existence is contained in the sūtras of all the Buddhas, (2) the statement in this sūtra that sūtras teaching a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha are of interpretable meaning, and (3) the statement in just this sūtra which says:

Just as a doctor distributes

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Medicines to the ill,

So the Buddha Teaches

Mind-Only to sentient beings.

With respect to statements that there are three final vehicles [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought, chapter VII], since one is able to understand the establishment of one final vehicle in Nāgārjuna's Compendium of Sūtra, such is not presented in Candrakīrti's Autocommentary. [117]

The mode of commenting upon the teaching of a mind-basis-of-all [in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought] as being of interpretable meaning by the passage in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra which indicates that a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is of interpretable meaning is as follows:

The teaching of the existence of a mind-basis-of-all is not literal because it is said in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra that the teaching of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is not literal. [That it is said in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra that the teaching of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is not literal] entails [that the teaching of the existence of a mind-basis-of-all is not literal] because it is explained in both the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned and the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra that the permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha is synonymous with mind-basis-of-all. This is because the Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned says:

[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown],

So the basis-of-all [is the basis for cyclic existence and nirvāṇa].

The virtuous tathāgatagarbha is also this [basis-of-all]... .[118]

Therefore, just the teaching that the former [tathāgatagarbha] is of interpretable meaning establishes that the latter [mind-basis-of-all] also is of interpretable meaning. This is because for whatever is synonymous there is

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no difference as to whether they exist or not.

Although the two meanings of the terms on the literal level are not synonymous, when the two meanings in his thought which are behind his speaking of those two are synonymous, then both sūtra passages effortlessly come to be non-literal. This is because both sūtra passages [which teach the mind-basis-of-all and a tathāgatagarbha] were spoken within [the Buddha's] thinking of something else behind them. [127] This is so because ºzong-ka-¸a's Illumination of the Thought says:

That which teaches the mind-basis-of-all as being of interpretable meaning is a passage teaching the permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha as being of interpretable meaning.

Question: How does the fact that the teaching of the existence of a permanent stable Tathāgatagarbha as being of interpretable meaning establish the mind-basis-of-all as being of interpretable meaning?

Reply: There are many statements explaining that these two are synonymous. The Sūtra on the Heavily Adorned says:

[Just as] lands [are the basis of] the varieties [of all things grown],

So the basis-of-all [is the basis for cyclic existence and nirvāṇa].

The virtuous tathāgatagarbha is also this [basis-of-all],

Tathāgatas teach the garbha with the term ‘basis-of-all.'

Though the garbha is proclaimed as the basis of all,

Those of weak intellect do not understand.

Also, the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra says:

The tathāgatagarbha, which is proclaimed as the mind-basis-of-all, together with the seven consciousnesses... .[119]

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Since it is explained with respect to those two that the one is permanent and the other is impermanent, it is not indicated that the two meanings on the literal level are the same. However, since the mind-basis-of-all was taught in consideration of just that meaning [i.e., emptiness] thinking of which he taught the garbha, therefore, in relation to the thought behind [his teaching], they are synonymous and hence mutually inclusive. In that way, just this teaching of the earlier [the tathāgatagarbha] as being of interpretable meaning establishes the latter [the mind-basis-of-all] also as being of interpretable meaning.

The mode of commenting upon the differentiation of the three natures into truly existent and non-truly existent as being of interpretable meaning by a passage in the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra is as follows:

Statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought as to a difference among the three natures with respect to whether they are truly established or not are not literal, because the Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra says: “Mahāmati, I teach that the characteristics of emptiness, non-production, non-duality, and non-inherent nature are contained in the sūtras of all the Buddhas.”[120]

[The fact that the sūtras of all the Buddhas teach these characteristics of emptiness, non-production, non-duality, and non-inherent nature] entails [that statements in the Sūtra Unraveling the Thought as to the particulars of true establishment and non-true establishment with respect to the three natures are not literal] because the realization of emptiness which is the absence of inherent existence is said to be the intended meaning of all the sūtras. Because of that, all the Buddha's pronouncements are said to be only flowing and descending into emptiness. This is because all [the Buddha's] pronouncements are methods for the full purification of the person.

The meaning of the words of the verse:

Just as a doctor distributes

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Medicines to the ill... .

has already been explained in the chapter on the Mind-Only school. How that [passage] comments upon the refutation of external objects as being of interpretable meaning is easy to understand.

【Bibliogaphy】

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p. 269

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ºzong-ka-¸a (tsong kha pa, 1357-1419). The Essence of Good Explanations, Treatise Discriminating the Interpretable and the Definitive (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po). P6142, Vol.

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153. Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973.

Sūtra Unravelling the Thought / mdo sde dgongs'grel / dgongs pa nges par'grel pa'i mdo, saṃdinirmocanasūtra. P 774.

爭議之揭示—月稱《入中論自釋》中有幾種不了義之經教？

馬紀
中華佛學研究所助理研究員