Attā, Nirattā, and Anattā in the early Buddhist literature

Summary

The present article deals with the non-Buddhist concepts of attā and their refutation through the doctrine of anattā. This article is divided into five sections.

Section I discusses Nikāya passages which states which the attā is not existent either in the sphere of the Conditioned or in the realm of the Unconditioned. It is nothing but a figment of imagination.

Section II refers to the different opinions held by scholars as to the proper implications of the term attā. Except for the lone voice of E. Conze who found similarity between the attā and the Puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya, all other scholars who cared to ponder over this problem, seem to be preoccupied with the relationship that could exist between the attṃ and the Ātman of the Upaniṣads. This may be due to the fact that these two terms-attā and Ātman-are philologically identical. The philological identity led the scholars readily to accept the view that these terms are also philosophically identical without making any further investigation into the exact onnotations of these two terms. The need for a more objective study of the problem of equation of attā and Ātman is obvious, and a suitable methodology for such a study has been suggesed.

Section III delineates the main features of the thoughts of the Śāśvatavādins, Ekacasassatavādins, the ucchedavādins and the followers of the Satkāyadṛṣṭi. They were the chief propagators of the attā heresies rejected by the Buddha.

Section IV, Part A contations the criticism of all these heresies meant for the Buddhist monks. The validity of such a criticism mainly rests on the Buddha's claim to superior and higher knowledge of which the heretics know nothing.Part B of the same Section offers us the following two patterns of reasonings which

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were ultimately meant for the non-Buddhist ascetics and employed for the refutation of the different attā heresies except the Ucchedavāda: I) To reject the opponent's view by showing the internal contradictions, a method which was later followed by Nāgārjuna with great success; ii) To temporarily accept a part of the opponent's view in order to show that the view as such is unacceptable. This may be taken as an instance of skillfulness of means praised so much in the Mahāyāna.

Section V comes to the conclusion that the anattā doctrine was mainly formulated keeping in view the śāśvatavāda and the Ucchedavāda. This is in conformity with some statements in the buddhist texts that the buddha preached the anattā doctrine as a middle way between these two extremes. It is also clear that the attā concepts of the Śāśvatavādins and the Uccedavśdins cannot be identical with the Ātman of the Upaniṣads. the Buddhist sages were aware of the fact the that the attā rejected by the buddha is 'ahaṅkāra-viṣayaḥ' whereas the Upaniṣadic Ātman is 'Buddhānām viṣayaḥ'.

關鍵詞：1.Attā　2.Nirattā　3.Anattā　4.Upaniṣad

I

The doctrine of anatā forms the keynote of the teachings of the Buddha and leterally means that the attā is non-existent. The denial of the attā finds expression in the following statement ascribed to the Buddha in the Samyutta Nikyāya: "Sabbam bhikkhave aniccaṃ/sabbam bhikkhave dukkhaṃ/sabbam bhikkhave anattā" [1]. The chapter just preceeding the one from which we have quoted the three statements, contains such expressions as "sabbe bhikkhave jarādhammaṃ……vyādhidhammaṃ……maraṇadhammaṃ……saṃkilesadhamaṃ" etc[2]. These statements leave no doubt that in all these cases we have to take the term 'sabba' as indicating the things condition. So we find that 'sabba' is a technical term and stands for the 'samskṛta dharma'. This conclusion of ours is confirmed by the definition of 'sabba' as given in the Sabbavaggo of the Salāyatana-saṁyutta [3]: "Kiñ ca bhikkhave sabbaṃ/cakkhu ceva rūpā ca/sotañca saddā ca/ghānañca gandhā ca/jihvā rasā ca/kayo ca phoṭṭhabbā ca/mano ca dhammā ca/idam vuccati bhikkhave sabbaṃ" According to this definition 'sabba' means eye and the forms, the nose and the smells, the ear and the sounds, the tongue and the tastes, the body and the tangible things, the mind and the mental objects. Here the term 'sabba' means twelve āyatana. In a more elaborate way the Buddha explains the same term while giving instructions on the giving up of the 'sabba'. He states that eye, form, eye-contact, eye-consciousness and the different feeling due to eye-contact are to be renounced. Similarly he preaches with references to other sense organs.[4] Thus the term 'sabba' fully covers the category of 'samskṛta-dharma' and the statement "sabbam anattā", means the conditioned is without any soul

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(soul).

But what about the Unconditioned? Is it also devoid of attā? Walpolo Rahulo thinks that it is, and refers to the three statements from Dhammapadain support of his contention.[5] These statements which are very similar to the passage from the Saṁyutta Nikāya quoted above are as follows:(i) sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, ii) sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā. iii), sabbe dhammā anattā. Rahulo thinks that while the phrase sabbe saṅkhārā indicates the things conditioned, the phrase sabbe dhammā refers to both the Conditioned and the Unconditioned. But it is difficult to accept this interpretation. We may hold that the word 'sabbe' should have the same meaning as the term 'sabbam'. viz. the conditioned things, and it is unreasonable to assume that the scope of the word 'sabba' while occuring together with the term 'dhamma' is so extended as to include even the opposite meaning, the Unconditioned. Moreover the phrase 'sabbe dhamma' has been used many times in the Buddhist scriptures to mean only the Conditioned. The Karatalaratna, a comparatively late work written by Bhāvaviveka, described śarvadharmāḥ' as being of dependent origin (sarvadharmāḥ …… pratītyasamutpannāḥ …… niḥsvabhāvāḥ)[6]. Again in the Culasaccakasutta of the Majjhima Nikaya [7] it is stated: "rūpaṁ bhikkhave aniccaṁ, vedanā aniccā,……viññānaṁ aniccaṁ, rūpam bhikkhave anattā, vedanā……saññā……samkhārā.……viññānam anattā, sabbe samkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā ti. "Here both the phrases 'sabbe dhammā' and sabbe samkhārā obviously refer to the five skandhas. That only the conditioned things are meant here become evident when in the same sutta [8] we meet with a discussion on things which are both aniccā and anattā. Nibbāna is not included on this discussion. The Upasivamānapucchāof the Sutta nipāta [9] (1076) states that in case of nibbāna all dharmas are destroyed (sabbesu

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dhammesu upahatesu). Sabbe dhammā has been explained as skandhas and āyatanas in the Cullaniddesa,[10] making it clear that nibbāna is outside the scope of this phrase. In the Mahāparinibbānasutta [11] Aniruddha explains buddha's parinibbana as 'vimokkho' of consciousness (pajjotass'eva nibbānam vimokkho cataso). The term 'vimokkho' has been explained by Buddhaghoso in the Sumangalavilasini [12] as freedom from all dharmas (vimokkho'ti kenaci dhemmena anābaraṇa). Thus the testimony of the Suttanipāta and the Mahā parinibbānasutta confirms that the phrase 'sabbe dhammā' does not include nibbāna within its scope.

So the things conditioned were definitely held to be devoid of attā. But was the nirvana, the Unconditioned also bereft of attā? Is the attā non-existent with reference to the Unconditioned also? In the Udāna[13]

nibbāna is described as anattā which is rightly glossed as attā-virahita in Paramatthadī pa. Thus the attā is non-existent either as a saṃskṛta-dharma or as an asaṃskṛta-dharma. The attā is nothing but a figment of imagination.

II

To know the reason behind the denial of attā we have first to be clear about the exact implication of the term attā. Scholars differ as to the precise sense in which this term has been used. But before their views were discussed it is necessary to point out that the prākṛt word attā is the same as ātman in Sanskrit. This philological identification has led to philosophical misunderstanding among the scholars. Some scholars automatically take attā to be the Ātman of the Upaniṣads. They think that the philosophical implications of these two termsattā and ātman-are identical and consequently the doctrine of anattā came to mean for them the refutation of the Upaniṣadic Ātman. The scholars belonging to this

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group have unfaltering faith in the Buddha as the unique preacher of the True Law, and as such harbourno weakness for the honoured traditions of the Upaniṣads. the view of Walpolo Sri Rahulo, an worthy representative of this group, will be presented later. On the other hand those scholars who hold both the Buddha and the Upsaniṣads in high esteem do not subscribe to this view. Let us take note of the opinion of Radhakrishnan [14] who belongs to this second group of scholars. According to him the Buddha clearly tells us what the soul (attā) is not, though he does not give us any clear account of what it is. It is, however, wrong tothink that there is no soul according to the Buddha. In support of his opinion Radhakrishnan [15]refers to the dialogue between the wondering ascetic Vacchagotta which, according to him, shows that something there is, though it is not the empirical self. In another place [16] he refers to this empirical self and states that it is the false view that clamours for the perpetual continuation of this small self, which the Buddha refutes. This, [17] according to Radhakrishnan, also agrees with the statement of the Buddha that the self is neither the same nor different from the skandhas. He further states [18]: "It is also clear that the reduction of the self to a number of skandhas is not ultimate. If the self is merely an impermanent compounded of body and mind …… then when it disappears then there is nothing which is delivered …… Freedom becomes extinction. But Nirvāṇa is timeless existence and so the Buddha admit the reality of a timeless self."

Radhakrishanan appers to be of the opinion that the term 'attā' which he translates as self has been used in two different senses. One meaning of attā is the small self or empirical self which the Buddha rejects through the doctrine of anattā. The other implication of the term attā is the ture self which is same as nirvāṇa and is accepted by the Buddha. It is the identity of this true self with other things that the buddha rejects.

We may now discuss the opinion of Rahulo who represents the other group

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of scholars. While explaining the doctrine of anattā Rahulo [19] refers to the different concepts of ātman, even the concept of Brahman-Ātman of the Upaniṣads and holds that the buddha was unique in rejecting all such doctrines through the doctrine of anattā. "The idea of an abiding, immortal substance in man or outside, whether it is called Ātman, I, soul, self, or ego, is considered only a false belief, a mental projection. This is the Budhist doctrine of anttā [20]. So it appears that by the doctrine of anattā the Buddha was denying attā " which was accepted by every other philosophico-religious system". Rahulo seems to suggest in not so abmiguous term that even the Brahman-Ātman concept of the Upaniṣads stands hereby negated.

It is clear that the concept of the Upaniṣadic Ātman acts as a powerful background in influencing the formulations of both the above-mentioned views. Conze,[21] on the other hand, propounds a different theory which is not connected with the Upaniṣadic Ātman in any way. He is not sure what notions of an ātaman were deined by the Buddha, but he believes that these notions are of two kinds, e.g. i) the ideas implied in the use of 'I' and 'mine', and ii) the philosophical opinion of the Sāṁkhya and Vaisseṣika. The basic formula absence of a self is confined to the five skandhas, and nothing is said either way about its existence quite apart from them. The Buddha never taught that the self is not, only that it cannot be apprehended.

It is obvious that the solution of this knotty problem hinges on the proper understanding of the nature of attā that was rejected by the Buddha. It is really strange that none of the scholars who suggested the equation of attā either with the Upaniṣadic Brahman-Ātman or with some other non-buddhist concepts ever tried to clearly enunciate what this attā is. Any such suggestion without first defining the concept of attā is bound to be methodologically unscientific and unconvincing.

To arrive at a more objective conclusion the following approach may be suggested. On the one hand we should study those materials from theNikāya and

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Āgama which are more or less descriptive in nature, Such materials provide us with legends and other informantions about the attā philosophy dominant in the region where the Buddha was preaching his anattā doctrine, and so engaged his attention. The reason for doing so is the justifiable surmise that the attā concept or concepts, the negation of which forms the core of buddhism, should find some mention in this descriptive type of scripture. On the other hand we should carefully scrutinise another type of material contained in the Buddhist scripture which is more critical and philosophical in nature, and acquaints us with detailed argumengs justifying the rejection of the attā philosophy. Out of such study will also emerge the atta concept or concepts which the Buddha was rejecting. The study of these two types of materials will enable us to form a complete idea of the different attā concepts the Buddha discarded as false views. It is only then we would be in a position to reliably know whether the Upaniṣadic concept of Ātman-Brahman was rejected or not.

The major non-buddhist concepts of attā criticised in the Nikāyas and Āgamas many be broadly divided nito four main categories dealing with a) Satkāyadṛṣṭi, b), Śāśvatavāda, c) Ekaccassatavāda, and d) ucchedavāda. We will discuss these heresies in the order given here.

III

a) Satkāyadṛṣṭi: In the Saṁyutta Nikāya [22] we come across the following description of a false view which later came to be known as Satkāyadṛṣṭi: "Those recluses and Brahmanas who while seeing in various ways see the attā (soul), they actually see the five aggregates of attachment or any of them. Which five? In this connection, monks, an uneducated ordinary person …… envisages matter as a soul, or a soul possessing matter, or matter in a soul, or a soul in matter. Or he envisages, feeling, perception, the gormative forces, or consciousness as a soul, possessed by a soul, in a soul, or soul in them. Envisaging thus he gets a thought "I am" …… Being ignorant he thinks this, or "I am this"or "I shall be""I shall not be"or I shall be material "or"I shall be having perception "or"I shall be

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without perception (a-samjñin)"or "I shall have neither perception nor non-perception. But one who is educated, abandons ignorance and gets knowledge …… and does not have any of these thoughts."

The passage quoted above shows that the attā in which these recluses and Brāhmaṇas believed could be in four different ways connected with the five skandhas and this connection is constant. The existence of an attā without any reference to the skandhas was unthinkable. This association of the soul with the skandhas gave rise to certain ego-centric thoughts in which both these elements-the soul and the skandhas-are present, e.g. "I am this" "I shall be material" etc.

Here we have a succinct description of a false view that draws our attention to its two main features: 1) attā refers to an individual soul whose essence consists of an awareness of 'I'[22a]; 2) attā is invariably connected with the skandhas. Its existence is always conceived in association with skandhas. This heresy, as already noted, came to be known as satkāyadṛṣṭi (Pali: Sakkāyadiṭṭhi). The term satkāya refers to the five aggregates of attachment (pañcupādānakkhandhā)[23] and Satkāyadṛṣṭi to a false view that fails to see the skandhas merely as skandhas, but always views them through the prism of an attā. The most subtle from of satkāyadṛṣṭi is discernible in the feeling "I am"which lingers in anybody who is spiritually below the status of an arhat. He may no longer consciously believe in

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it, he may even intellectually refute it, but he is not yet free from the vestige of this pernicious heresy.[24]

We may refer to passage in the Kośa literature that helps us to understand more clearly the different modes of relationship existing between the soul and the five skandhas (Conze, p.33). This passage, like the Saṁyutta Nikāya account, distinguishes between the twenty bases of grasping at the notion of soul. One regards (1-5) the soul as the five skandhas, as the flame of a lamp is identical with its visual appearance; (6-10) the soul as having or possessing the five skandhas, like the shadow of a thing; (11-15) the skandhas in the soul, as the scent in a flower; (16-20) the soul in the skandhas, as the gem in the casket.[25]

This account of the Sathāyadṛṣṭi acquaints us with the most basic form of attā heresy. Satkāyadṛṣṭi merely postulates a relationship between the soul and the five skandhas. It neither advocates the eternity of the soul nor holds the soul to be co-terminous with the body. Satkāyadṛṣṭi is neither Śāśvatavāda nor Ucchedavāda. But the following statement recorded in the Saṁyutta Nikāya [26] imā kho gahapati ditthiyo sakkāyaditthiya sati honti-shows that the satkāya dṛṣṭi is the root cause of all other heresies, including the Śāśvatavāda and the Ucchedavāda. A person believing in a soul and having desire for existence (bhava-tṛṣṇā) willingly believes that the soul survies the body and accepts the false view of its permanetnt existence (bhava-dṛṣṭi). On the other hand, a person thirsting for non-existence (vibhava-tṛṣṇā), willingly believes that death is the ultimate end of every thing, and comes to believe in the false view of non-existence (Vibhavadṛṣṭi) the annihilation of soul after death (Ucchedavāda).[27]

b) Śāśvatavāda: The account of the Śāśvatavāda as given in the Brahma-jālasutta[28] may be abridged as follows:-

There are recluses and Brahmanas who accept the philosophy of eternalism (sassatavāda) and proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal. And why they do so? Some recluse and Brahmana by means of exertion and proper mental attention attains to such a cencentration of mind that they are able to recall to mind many hundreds of thousands of past births. And they think: "There

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I was born of such a name (evaṃ-nāmo), of such a lineage and caste (evaṃ-gotto, evaṃ-vaṇṇo).[29]My food was such (evaṃ-āhāro) . I was the experiencer of such pleasures and pains (evam-sukha-dukkha-paṭisaṃvedī) and had such a span of life (evam-āyu-pariyanto). Falling from there I was born here."[30] Thus they remember their past existences in full detail. And each of them says to himself: "sassato attā ca loko ca vañjho kutaṭṭho esikaṭṭhāyiṭhito, te ca sattā sandhāvanti saṃsaranti cavanti upapajjanti, atthi tveva sassata-saman ti."[31] T.W.Rhys Davids translates as follows: "The soul is eternal; and the world giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a moutain-peak, as a pillar firmly fixed; and that though these living creatures transmigrate and pass away, fall from one state of existence and spring up in another, yet they are (atthi) for ever and ever." [32]

Though this translation tallies with the traditional Buddhist explanation, it is difficult to accept it, as it raises some problems. From the legend we have seen that the living beings in this world could only remembers the details of their past lives here. And an awareness of an unchangeable 'I' (cf. I was born with such a name etc.) links all these past lives together and gives rise to the notion of an eternal soul (attā). The same soul was thought to be born again and again as different individuals. The attā and sattā are not identical. The skandhas are admitted to be different in each of these births, though the attā characterised by the awareness of an'I' remains unchanged.

The above translation from Rhys Davids of the stock description of Śāśvatavāda is not in aggreement with the implications of the Śāśvatavāda legend. In this translation not only the two verbs of motion ( sandhāvanti and saṃsaranti) indicating repeated deaths and rebirths and so underlining changes are connected with the sattā but also the verb of existence (atthi) indicating permanency becomes associated with the same sattā. If we accept this translation we have to admit that the Śāśvatavādins thought the concept of eternity to be compatible with the

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notion of change. The soul's enternity was not at variance with its identity with the changeable skandhas. But there is no reason to believe that the Śāśvatavādins were so unrealistic as to support such an unreasonable view. We have seen that according to the Śāśvatavāda the eternal soul characterised by a sense of 'I' was different from the changing individuals. Moreover, other religious groups contemporary of the Śāśvatavāda were also not supporters of such a view. The ucchedavādins [33] took the soul to be identical with the skandhas, and consistent with this view they held that the soul is destroyed together with the body. The Ekaccasassatavādins [34] believed the Mahābrahmā to be eternal as they did not appear to have known that the Mahābrahmā was also identical with the skandhas, created, and subject to death. All the religious groups including the Śāśvatavādins thus seem to have held the view that the soul to be eternal must have an existence independent of the skandhas. So the translation making the sattā eternal cannot be accepted. The only other possibility is to take 'atthi' in the sense of a singular number and to connect it with 'attā'. Then we get the following translation: "The soul is eternal; and the world giving birth to nothing new, is steadfast as a mountain-peak, as pillar firmly fixed; and these living beings move on and on, transmigrate, fall from one state of existence, rise up in another, but (the soul) exists for eternity."

For our purpose it is, however, important to know how the buddhists would understand this philosophy. From our discussion of the Satkāyadṛṣṭi it is clear that according to the Buddhist's interpretation of the false view the soul must be either identical with or closely related to the Skandhas. This relation is such that the existence of a soul apart from the skandhas is unthinkable. The changes which the skandhas undergo even during one's lifetime are obvious. Moreover the acceptance of the repeated deaths and rebirths shows that the skandhas do not remain unchanged. In short, according to the buddhist interpretation, the Śāśvatavādins admitted the changeable nature of the skandhas, accepted the close relationship existing between the soul and the skandhas, and yet held the soul to be eternal (sassato). This also seems to be the opinion of Buddhaghosa [35] as

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expressed in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, But, as already shown, Buddhist presentation of the eternalism is not the same as the original philosiophy of the Śāśvatavādins. The Śāśvatavādins themselves regarded 'attā' to be independent of body and mind, i.e. of the skandhas, to use the Buddhist terminology. This seems to be reason why the Śāśvatavādins themselves did not relate the soul to any of the skandhas in the stock description of their own philosophy. Even the logicians and thinkers (takkī, vīmaṅsī)[36] among them have nothing to say about the relationship existing between the soul and the skandhas.

Whatever may be the case, it is of no consequence for our present study that the Buddhist presentation of the attā of the Śāśvatavādins does not tally with the original concept. What really matters is the idea the Buddhists had of such a concept. For when they reject a concept of an eternal soul, they do so in the light of their own understanding of it. So it is important to take note of their idea of the attā concept which may be described as follows: The attā is an eternally existent indiv idual soul which is either identical with the skandhas or so closely attains liberation nor gets annihilated.

c) Ekaccasassatavāda: A concept of attā different from that of the eternalists has been recorded in the Brahmajālasuttaof the Dīgha-Nikāya.[37] This is the concept of an eternal soul unique to the Mahābrahmā as held by the followers of the Ekaccasassatavāda. The Buddha in order to explain the origin of the Ekaccasassatavāda relates the following legend about the past lives of the upholders of this philosophy:

When the world system dissolves the beings are reborn in the Ābhassara world. They are made of mind. Now the world system begins to come into exitence and an empty Braham-vimāna (Brahma-palace) appears. One of the beings at the end of merits or span of life falls from the Ābhassara world and is reborn in the Brahma-palace. There he lives, made of mind (manomayo), feeding on joy (pīti-bhakkho), radiating light. Etc. and thus does remain there for a

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long time. And the feels lonely and longs for companions. Just then some beings die in the Ābhassara world and are born in the Brahma-palace. They are just like the being who was first born. As these beings were born after he desired for company, he thought himself to be Brahmā Mahābrahmā, Creator, Father of all that are and are to be. And the other beings also thought that they have been created by Mahābrahmā. Their lives are of shorter duration than that of Mahābrahmā. They die in the Brahma-palace and are reborn here in this world. Here one of them leads a religious life and can remember his past existence in the Brahma-palace, but not beyond that. He thinks of Mahābrahmā as creator permanent, fixed, eternal, of a nature which is not subject to transformation (nicco, dhuvo, sassato, aviparināmadhammo) while he regards himself and other beings as created by Mahābrahmā, impermanent, not fixed, eternal, and having the nature of dying (ancicā, addhuvā, appayukā, cavanadhammā).

The last part of the above account seems to be a stock description which formed a part of the original philosophy of the Ekaccasassatavādins. According to their philosophy only the uncreated is eternal while the created is impermanent. Only Mahābrahmā is eternal and the other beings are impermanent. The information that Mahābrahmā was made of mind were most probably not included in their philosophy, for it is not mentioned in the utterance of him who remembers his past existence. Otherwise we have to assume that according to the Ekaccasassatavādins mind can be both created and uncreated. So it appears that this extra bit of information has been added in accordance with the Buddhist dogma. Thus as per the understandings of the Buddhists, the followers of the Ekaccasassatvāda believed in an eternal soul only in case of mahābrahmā and this soul was made of mind, uncreated and immortal.

Two other groups of the Ekaccasassatavādins [38] believed in many eternal individual souls. But the eternity is not absolute in these cases; it may be lost either due to the lack of self-controll or due to envy. The fourthe group of the Ekaccasassatavādins [39] were comprised of the logicians and the thinkers who concluded by reasoning that there are two souls, one impermanent and the other

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permanent. The soul consisting of ear, nose tongue and body is impermanent, not fixed, not eternal and having the changeable nature. But the soul which is thought or mind or consciousness (cittan ti va mano ti va viññānan ti va) is permanent, eternal etc.

d) Ucchedavāda: the seven groups of Ucchedavādins [40] identified an individual soul variously with physical body, or sensual desire, or mind, or infinite space, or infinite consciousness, or nothingness, or neither perception nor not perception. The first group believed in one soul made of gross matter while the other groups believed in more than one souls. And all these groups upheld the doctrine that the soul is annihilated with the destruction of the body. It appears that even before the Buddhists the Ucchedavādins denied the belief in an eternal individual soul (attā) which was identical with one of the skandhas. Therefore this philosophy came to be known as the doctrine of nirattā.

So far we have discussed the Satkāyadṛṣṭi, Śāśvatavāda, Ekaccasasvatavāda and the Ucchedavāda, and these are the only dominant heresies regarding attā and relevant to our study that have been recorded in the Āgamas and Nikāyas. [41] Presumably these were the four main type of heresies that attracted the attention of the Buddha and the early Buddhists. It is obvious that the attā concepts discussed in the Ucchedavāda and Satkāyadṛṣṭi can in no way be connected with the problem of attā's identity with the Upaniṣadic Ātman. It is only ths Śāśvatavāda and Ekaccasassatavāda concept that deserves to be considered in tis connection.

In course of our discussion we have noted the following characteristics of an eternal soul as envisaged by the followers of the Śāśvatavāda and Ekaccasassatavāda. The first group of Ekaccasassatavāda believed that only the

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soul of Mahābrahmā, who is uncreated, is eternal. But the Śāśvatavāda and the other groups of Ekaccasassatavāda recognise numerous, eternal, individual souls who are either identical with the skandhas or so closely related to them as to be dependent on them for their very existence. The second and third groups of the Ekaccasassatavādins, however, are of the opinion that the eternity is not absolute, for the beings die if they indulge in sensual pleasures or are afflicted with jealousy. The first type of Ekaccasassatavāda explicitly states that the souls, including that of the Mahābrahmā, are made of mind. This view seems to have been accepted by the second and third groups of the Ekaccasassatavādins who made the eternity of the individual souls dependent on the purity of mind. According to the fourth group of the Ekaccasassatavādins which consists of the logicians and the thinkers, the individual soul is identical with citta or manas or vijñāna. Thus we find that the Ekaccasassatavāda concept of soul belonged to the sphere of mind and at least in most cases could not rise beyond the Rūpaloka. Moreover the eternal souls are confined within space and time and are characterised by the subject-object split.

The Upaniṣadic Ātman, on the other hand, is not an individual soul. The Ātman is the supreme reality, the only Being that is beyond speech, beyond the reach of mind and the notion of space. And such an Ātman can by no strech of imagination be equated with any of the skandhas. In short, the sassato attā of the Buddhist scriptures and the Ātman of the Upanisads are two diametrically opposing points of view.

So long we have discussed scriptural materials which are more or less descriptive in nature. Now we pay attention to a more critical type of āgama-Nikāya passages which acquaint us with the reasons for the rejection of different types of atā heresies, and thereby provide us with some extra details regarding these heresies.

IV

We have seen that four kinds of relationship between the attā and the skandhas were recognised. Out of these only one type of relationship viz. that of identity between the attā and the skandhas, finds prominent mention in the Nikāyas and the āgamas. This appears to have been the dominant heresy at the

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time of the Buddha. Only in a few cases the early buddhist canon takes note of other types of relationship, viz. attā has skandhaka or attā is not a particular type of skandhaka. Again the nature and contents of such a criticism of attā heresy vary depending on the type of persons for whom it was meant. The discourses which are held for the benefit of the Buddhist monks are quite different from those meant for non-Buddhist asceties.

With these preliminary remarks we will proceed to arrange the relevant materials according to the type of heresies criticised and the type of persons addressed.

V

We have shown that the early Buddhist scripture rejected any notion of attā which was either identical with the skandhas or dependent on them for its very existence. The Buddha specially took great paints to discard the Śāśvatavādins and the Ucchedavādins who preached the philosophy of attā and nirattā respectively. The Buddhists were aware of this fact and gave expression to it in

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canonical and non-canonical texts. We will cite a few quotations from the Buddhist texts in support of our view. In the Duṭṭhaṭṭhakasutta (No.8) of the Suttanipāta we read the following verse:[55]

"attam nirattam na hi tassa aṭṭhi adhosi se diṭṭhimidha sabbā"

Here the belief in attā and nirattā are counted among the false views (diṭṭhi) which a follower of the Buddha has given up. Again the following two verses from Lalitavistara [56] and Madhyamikakārikā [57] while confirming the Buddhist rejection of both attā and nirattā give some extra information regarding these heresies:

i) astināstivinirumktamātmyanairātmyavarjitam prakṛtyā jātinirdeśam dharmacakram ihocyate.

ii) astīti śāśvatagrāho nastītyucchedādarśanam tasmādastivanāstitve nāśriyeta vicakṣana.

From the verses quoted above it is evident that the existence of an eternal indireidual soul (attā) was preached in the philosophy of the Śāśvatavāda and term 'asti' in its vocabulary did not convey the ordinary meaning of mere existence but acquired the special sense of eternal existence. On the other hand the Ucchedavāda which preached the philosophy of nirattā (nairātmya), coined the term'nasti' to signify simultaneous annihilation of the temporarily existing attā and the physical body. It is in these special senses that the Pali Buddhist texts use these two terms 'asti' and 'nasti' while recording the dialogues between the Buddha and the non-Buddhist ascetics. Any lack of awareness of the special imports of 'asti' and 'nāsti' may result in drawing wrong conclusions from such dialogues.

As the ego-centricity and absolute dependence on the Skandakas-the two

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hallmarks of the concept of attā-can be no means by associated with the Upaniṣadic Ātman-Brahman, it is but natural that the Nikāya criticisms do not contain any reference to the Upaniṣadic concept. The post-canonical early Buddhist texts also never confused attā with the Ātman-Brahman of the Upaniṣads. In the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā [58] ātman is used together with such terms as jīva, sattva and pudgala. All these terms are put in the same category and are used to denote different aspects of the same ego-centric entity. 'Sacet Bodhisattvasya sattva saṃjñā pravarteta na sa bodhisattva iti vaktavya. Tat kasya hetoh? na sa Subhūte bodhisattvo vaktavyo yasya ātma-saṃjñā pravarteta, sattva-saṃjñā vā jīvasaṃjñā vā pudgala-saṃjñā va pravarteta'.'If in a Bodhisattva the perception of a being should take place, then he could not be called a Bodhisattva. And why? He is not to be called a Bodhisattva in whom the perception of a soul, or a being, or a living being, or a person would take place'.[59] Similary in the early Mādhyamika literature we read:'Ko 'yam ātmā yo 'haṅkāraviṣayaḥ', which may be translated as follows: What is this ātman that is the domain of ego? [60] Here ātman(Pali: attā) is characterised by ahaṅkāra. In this context we may refer to the definition of 'upadhi' in sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇam as given by Candrakīrti[61] in the Prasannapadā: tatra upadhiyate asminn ātmasneha ity upadhiḥ, upadhi śabdenātmaprajñapti-nimittāḥ pañcopādānaskandhā ucyante'. Here the concept of ātmā is held to be caused by the five aggregates of attachment. The same idea is expressed by Buddhaghosa [62] while defining 'attabhāva'. 'Attabhāvo vuccanti sarīram. Khandha-pañcakam eva vā, tam upādāya paññatti-matta sabhāvato'. Conze translates: 'Personal existence means the body, or the five Skandhas together, because dependent on them this mere concept cones about'.[63] Thus it is clear that these early Buddhist texts while discussing the concept of attā never thought about the Upaniṣadic Ātman, but remained faithful to the Nikāya

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characteristics of attā, viz. the ego-centricity and its invariable relationship with the skandhas. This point has been clearly stated by Vasubandhu. In his Viṃśatikā-vṛtti Vasubandhu[64] states: 'Yo bālair dharmānām svabhavo grāhyagrāhakadiḥ parikalpitas tena parikalpitenātmanā teṣām nairātmyam, na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānām viṣayaḥ 'It is because of that imaginary ātman which the ignorant people think to the things' self-being consisting of subject and object etc., that the things are devoid of ātman, not because of the ineffable Ātman which is the domain of the Buddhas'. The attā rejected by the Bhaddhas is "ahaṅkāra-viṣayaḥ"whereas the ineffable Upaniṣadic Ātman is 'buddhānām viṣayaḥ'.

初期佛教文獻的Attā、Nirattā 和 Anattā